The Locrian Ajax

Dem. Socrates, I was wanting to have some private talk with you, if you had time to spare; even if there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time, do spare some, nevertheless, for me.

Soc. Why, in any case I happen to have time to spare, and for you, moreover, I have plenty. Well, you are free to say whatever you wish.

Dem. Then do you mind if we step aside here from the street into the portico of Zeus the Liberator This portico or colonnade was near that of the King Archon, close to the Agora?

Soc. As you think best.

Dem. Let us go, then. Socrates, it would seem that all growths follow the same course, both those that grow from the earth, and the animals, including man. In regard to the plants, as you know, we who cultivate the earth find it the easiest part of our work to make all our preparations that are needed before planting, and to do the planting itself; but when the plant begins to grow, thenceforward we have a great deal of difficult and vexatious business in tending the new growth. Such, it seems, is also the case in regard to men: I take my own concerns as evidence for judging of the rest. For indeed I have found the planting, or the procreation—whichever one ought to call it—of this son of mine the easiest thing in the world; but his upbringing has been vexatious and a constant source of alarm, so great are my fears for him. Among the many instances that I could mention, the desire which occupies him at the moment is a thing that especially alarms me: for it is not an ill-bred desire, but a dangerous one, since here we have him, Socrates, as he says, desiring to become wise. My opinion is that some of his fellow-townsmen, about his own age, who pay visits to the city, excite him with accounts of certain discussions they have heard there; and in his envy of these he has long been pestering me with the demand that I should take due thought for his needs, and pay fees to some sophist or other who will make him wise. Now I do not mind so much about the fees, but I believe he is running into no slight danger where he is hastening.

Dem. I did for a time restrain him with good advice; but since I am no longer able to do so, I believe my best course is to comply with his request, in order that he may not resort, perchance, behind my back to somebody who will corrupt him. So I have come now on this very business of placing this youth with one of these sophists, or purveyors of wisdom, as they are held to be. It is a happy chance, therefore, that has thrown you in our way, as I should be particularly glad, with this plan of action in my mind, to ask your advice. Come, if you have any advice to give on what you have heard from me, you not only may, but should, give it.

Soc. Well, you know, Demodocus, they do say that advice is a holy thing. i.e. something above and apart from the adviser’s personal interests, and looking only to what is best. And so, if ever it is to be accounted holy, it must be in this instance, in which you now seek it. For there is no more divine matter on which a mortal could take counsel than the education either of himself or of his relations. Now, first of all, let you and me come to an agreement as to what we suppose that this thing can be, on which we are taking counsel; for it may happen that I conceive it to be one thing, and you another, and then when we have proceeded some little way in our conference, we may perceive how ridiculous we are, I the adviser and you the advised, in having no common ground in our notions.

Dem. Why, I think you are right there, Socrates, and we should do as you suggest.

Soc. Yes, I am right, but yet not entirely, because I have a slight change to make. For it occurs to me that this youngster may not be desiring the thing that we suppose him to desire, but something else, and there again we may be still more absurdly taking counsel on some other thing. Hence our most proper course, it seems to me, is to begin with the youth himself, and inquire of him what it actually is that he desires.

Dem. It does rather look, in fact, as though our best way would be thus, as you suggest.

Soc. Then tell me, what is the young person’s goodly name: how are we to address him?

Dem. Theages is his name, Socrates.

Soc. Goodly is the name, Demodocus, and holy-sounding, Theages means god-guided. that you have bestowed on your son. Tell me, then, Theages, do you say you desire to become wise, and do you require your father here to find out a school of some man who is qualified to make you wise?

The. Yes.

Soc. And which sort of man do you call wise, those who have knowledge of such and such a thing, whatever it may be, or those who have not?

The. Those who have knowledge, I say.

Soc. Well now, has not your father taught and educated you in the subjects which form the education of everyone else here—all the sons of noble and honorable fathers—in letters, I mean, and harping and wrestling and the other sorts of contest?

The. Yes, he has.

Soc. And you think you are still lacking in some knowledge which it behoves your father to provide for you?

The. I do

Soc. What knowledge is it? Tell us on our side, that we may oblige you.

The. He knows it, as well as I, Socrates, since I have often told him; only he says this to you of set purpose, making as if he did not know what I desire. For he assails me too with other statements of the same sort, and refuses to place me with any instructor.

Soc. Well, what you said to him before was spoken, as it were, without witnesses; but now you shall take me as a witness, and declare before me what is this wisdom that you desire. Come now; suppose you desired the wisdom whereby men steer a ship, and I happened to put this further question to you: Theages, what wisdom is it that you lack, when you blame your father for refusing to place you with people who would enable you to become wise? What answer would you have given me? What wisdom would you name? The steersman’s art, would you not?

The. Yes.

Soc. And if a desire to be wise in the wisdom whereby they steer chariots led you to blame your father, and I asked what wisdom this was, what would you name in reply? The charioteer’s art, would you not?

The. Yes.

Soc. And is that which you happen to be desiring now a nameless one, or has it a name?

The. I should say it has a name.

Soc. Now do you know it, though not its name, or do you know its name as well?

The. I know its name as well.

Soc. Then what is it? Tell me.

The. What other name, Socrates, can one give it but wisdom?

Soc. And the driver’s art too is wisdom? Or do you think it is ignorance?

The. I do not.

Soc. You call it wisdom?

The. Yes.

Soc. What use do we make of it? Is it not the art whereby we know how to govern a team of horses?

The. Yes.

Soc. And the steersman’s art too is wisdom?

The. I think so.

Soc. Is not this the art whereby we know how to govern ships?

The. Yes, it is.

Soc. And the wisdom that you so desire, what is it? That whereby we know how to govern whom?

The. To govern men, I imagine.

Soc. Sick men, do you mean?

The. Oh, no.

Soc. For that is medicine, is it not?

The. Yes.

Soc. Well, that whereby we know how to govern the singers in a chorus?

The. No.

Soc. For that is music?

The. To be sure.

Soc. Well, that whereby we know how to govern men in gymnastic training?

The. No.

Soc. For that is gymnastics?

The. Yes.

Soc. Well, to govern people who do what? Endeavor your best to speak, as I did to you at the beginning.

The. To govern the people in the city, I imagine.

Soc. And are the sick people also in the city?

The. Yes, but I mean not these only, but all the rest who are in the city besides.

Soc. Do I understand what art it is that you mean? For you strike me as meaning, not that whereby we know how to govern reapers and harvesters and planters and sowers and threshers, for it is the farmer’s art whereby we govern these, is it not?

The. Yes.

Soc. Nor, I suppose, do you mean that whereby we know how to govern sawyers and borers and planers and turners, as a class together; for is not that carpentry?

The. Yes.

Soc. But perhaps it is that whereby we govern, not only all these, but farmers themselves also, and carpenters, and all craftsmen and ordinary people, whether men or women: that, perhaps, is the wisdom you mean.

The. That, Socrates, is what I have been intending to mean all the time.

Soc. Then can you tell me whether Aegisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, governed all these people that you mean craftsmen and ordinary people, both men and women, or some other persons?

The. No, just those.

Soc. Well now, did not Peleus, son of Aeacus, govern these same people in Phthia?

The. Yes.

Soc. And have you ever heard of Periander, son of Cypselus, and how he governed at Corinth?

The. I have.

Soc. Did he not govern these same people in his city?

The. Yes.

Soc. Or again, do you not consider that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, who governed recently in Macedonia, governed these same people?

The. I do.

Soc. And who do you think were governed by Hippias, son of Peisistratus, who governed in this city? Were they not these people ?

The. To be sure they were.

Soc. Now, can you tell me what appellation is given to Bacis and Sibyl and our native Amphilytus? In Aristophanes and Plato we find mention of only one Sibyl: later the name, like Bacis (an old Boeotian prophet), was applied to several oracular persons in different places. Amphilytus seems to have come from Acarnania to Athens in the time of Peisistratus.

The. Why, soothsayers, of course, Socrates.

Soc. That is correct. But try to answer me in that way regarding those others—Hippias and Periander: what appellation is given them on account of their government?

The. Despots, I suppose; it must be that.

Soc. And when a man desires to govern the whole of the people in his city, he desires the same government as those did—despotism, and to be a despot?

The. Apparently.

Soc. And it is this that you say you desire?

The. It seems so, from what I have said.

Soc. You scoundrel! So you were desiring to govern us, all the time that you were blaming your father for not sending you to some seminary of despots! And you, Demodocus, are you not ashamed of having known all the time what he is desiring, and though you could have sent him where you would have made him an expert in the wisdom which he desires, actually grudging it to him and refusing to send him? But now, look here, as he has declared against you in my presence, shall you and I consult together on the question of whose school we shall send him to, and whose classes will help him to become a wise despot?

Dem. Yes, in faith, Socrates, let us certainly consult, as I feel this is a matter on which no slight counsel is needed.

Soc. By and by, my good sir. Let us first cross-examine him thoroughly.

Dem. Examine him then.

Soc. Well now, what if we called in Euripides to our aid, Theages? For you know Euripides says:Despots are wise by converse with the wise. Soph. Fr. 14.1 This line, also quoted and attributed to Euripides in Plat. Rep. 568a, appears to belong really to Sophocles’ lost tragedy The Locrian Ajax. Now, if someone should ask Euripides: Euripides, in what are these men wise, by whose converse you say that despots are wise? I mean, suppose he had said:Farmers are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? Surely none other than,—In farming.

The. That, and none other.

Soc. Or again, if he had said:Piemen are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him, Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? He would have said,—In the pie-making business,—would he not?

The. Yes.

Soc. Or again, if he had saidWrestlers are wise by converse with the wise,and we had asked him, Wise in what?—would he not reply,—In wrestling?

The. Yes.

Soc. But as he said:Despots are wise by converse with the wise,? Soph. Fr. 14.1 and we ask him,—In what do you mean that the latter are wise, Euripides?—what will he reply? What sort of subjects will he mention here?

The. Why, upon my word, I for my part do not know.

Soc. Well, do you mind if I tell you?

The. If you do not mind.

Soc. They are the same subjects that Anacreon said Callicrite understood; or do you not know the ode? Nothing is known of this poem.

The. I do.

Soc. Well then, do you desire to partake in some instruction of that sort from any man who is a fellow-craftsman of Callicrite, daughter of Cyane, and knows all about despotism as she did, according to the poet, in order that you may become a despot over us and our city?

The. You are joking all this time, Socrates, and making fun of me.

Soc. Why, do you not say that you desire that wisdom which will enable you to govern all the citizens? And in doing that, will you be anything else but a despot ?