Fr. Nor that either. Soc. Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good? Fr. Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me. Soc. You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil. Fr. I do. Soc. Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it? Fr. What do you mean by this question? Soc. I will explain. Is there both good and evil food? Fr. Yes. Soc. And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil? Fr. Yes. Soc. And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance, 
 one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked. Fr. Yes. Soc. But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous. Fr. What you say is true. Soc. Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain? Fr. Necessarily. Soc. So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort 
 is found to be more gain, as we agree. Fr. Yes. Soc. For neither of them has addition of either more or less. Fr. No, indeed. Soc. And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions? Fr. Impossible. Soc. Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain: 
 what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you— for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not? Fr. I would. Soc. And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body, 
 whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one’s expense. Fr. I believe that is what I call gain. Soc. Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness? Fr. Upon my word, not I. Soc. And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss? Fr. Gain. Soc. Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition. Fr. No, indeed. Soc. Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good? Fr. Apparently one will, if it is good. Soc. And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss? Fr. I think so. Soc. You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil. Fr. For my part, I cannot tell what to say. Soc. And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain? Fr. I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent. Soc. Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me,
 if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss? Fr. Loss, I presume, Socrates for one’s gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver. Soc. But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half? Fr. Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold. Soc. So gain, it seems, must have this addition of worth. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth. Fr. Assuredly, for that is the case. Soc. Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain. Fr. Yes. Soc. And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess? Fr. Yes, to possess. Soc. And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable? Fr. The profitable, I presume. Soc. And the profitable is good? Fr. Yes. Soc. And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good? Fr. So it seems. Soc. Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose? Fr. I think I do. Soc. In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked. Fr. Yes. Soc. And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good? Fr. Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me. Soc. Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones. Fr. Yes, I do admit it. Soc. And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not? Fr. I do. Soc. But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains. Fr. I did. Soc. And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked. Fr. Apparently. Soc. Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.