Soc. Come then, what is taking pains over oneself — for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things? Alc. I at least believe so. Soc. Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet? Alc. I do not understand. Soc. Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger? Alc. No, indeed. Soc. And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way? Alc. Yes. Soc. And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body? Alc. Yes. Soc. Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet? Alc. I do not quite understand, Socrates. Soc. Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not? Alc. I do. Soc. And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better? Alc. Yes. Soc. Then what art makes shoes better? Alc. Shoe-making. Soc. So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes? Alc. Yes. Soc. And over our foot too by shoe-making? Or by that art whereby we make feet better? Alc. By that art. Soc. And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better? Alc. I think so. Soc. And is not that gymnastic? Alc. Certainly. Soc. So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot? Alc. Quite so. Soc. And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand? Alc. Yes. Soc. And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving and the rest over what belongs to the body? Alc. Absolutely so. Soc. Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts. Alc. Apparently. Soc. So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself. Alc. Not at all. Soc. For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one’s belongings would not be the same. Alc. Apparently not. Soc. Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves? Alc. I cannot say. Soc. Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so? Alc. That is true. Soc. Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe? Alc. Impossible. Soc. Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring. Alc. True. Soc. Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves? Alc. Impossible. Soc. Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi ; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody? Alc. I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard. Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can. Alc. That is so. Soc. Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself This seems to be a sudden adumbration of the Platonic idea or form which remains constant, and so the same, behind the shifting objects of sense related to it through its influences or impress. Cf. below, Plat. Alc. 1.130d . be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail. Alc. Rightly spoken. Soc. Steady, then, in Heaven’s name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not? Alc. Yes. Soc. And I in turn to you ? Alc. Yes. Soc. Then the talker is Socrates? Alc. To be sure. Soc. And the hearer, Alcibiades? Alc. Yes. Soc. And Socrates uses speech in talking? Alc. Of course. Soc. And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose. Alc. To be sure. Soc. But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not? Alc. How do you mean? Soc. For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts. Alc. Yes. Soc. And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting? Alc. Of course. Soc. And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself? Alc. Yes. Soc. Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things. Alc. They are. Soc. Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well? Alc. With his hands as well. Soc. So he uses these also? Alc. Yes. Soc. Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making? Alc. Yes. Soc. And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things? Alc. Yes. Soc. Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from the hands and eyes that they use for their work? Alc. Apparently. Soc. And man uses his whole body too? Alc. To be sure. Soc. And we said that the user and what he uses are different? Alc. Yes. Soc. So man is different from his own body? Alc. It seems so. Soc. Then whatever is man? Alc. I cannot say. Soc. Oh, but you can—that he is the user of the body. Alc. Yes. Soc. And the user of it must be the soul? Alc. It must. Soc. And ruler? Alc. Yes. Soc. Now, here is a remark from which no one, I think, can dissent. Alc. What is it? Soc. That man must be one of three things. Alc. What things? Soc. Soul, body, or both together as one whole. Alc. Very well. Soc. But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man? Alc. We have. Soc. And does the body rule itself? Alc. By no means. Soc. Because we have said that it is ruled. Alc. Yes. Soc. Then that cannot be what we are seeking. Alc. It seems not. Soc. Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man? Alc. Perhaps it is. Soc. The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling. Alc. You are right. Soc. But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul. Alc. Precisely so. Soc. Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man? Alc. No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved. Soc. And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration. Alc. What is that? Soc. The point suggested in that remark a moment ago, Cf. Plat. Alc. 1.129b . that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul. Alc. No, indeed. Soc. And it is proper to take the view that you and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul? Alc. Quite so. Soc. Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with Alcibiades—that is, with his soul. Alc. I believe so. Soc. Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul. Alc. So it seems. Soc. And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself. Alc. That is so. Soc. Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer. Alc. It seems not. Soc. And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended. Alc. That is true. Soc. So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art. Alc. None, I agree. Soc. And that is why these arts are held to be sordid, and no acquirements for a good man. Alc. Quite so. Soc. Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself? Alc. It looks rather like it. Soc. But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things? Alc. I agree. Soc. So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business. Alc. Correct. Soc. And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades’ body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades? Alc. That is true. Soc. Your lover is rather he who loves your soul? Alc. He must be, apparently, by our argument. Soc. And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over? Alc. Apparently. Soc. Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better? Alc. So it seems. Soc. And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body’s prime is over, and the rest have departed. Alc. Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go. Soc. Then you must endeavor to be as handsome as you can. Alc. Well, I shall endeavor. Soc. You see how you stand: Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete. Alc. True. Soc. And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you? Alc. Yes, that was so. Soc. Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is losing its charm, while you are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is the people of great-hearted Erechtheus; Hom. Il. 2.547 but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend. Alc. What is it? Soc. Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm. Alc. Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves. Soc. Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves. Alc. That is so. Soc. And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that. Alc. Clearly. Soc. While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers. Alc. Quite so. Soc. Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven’s name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now? Alc. With what intent do you say that, Socrates? Soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which the inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight. Alc. What do you mean by that? Soc. Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice See thyself, how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at that by looking at which it would see itself? Alc. Clearly. Soc. Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves. Alc. Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort. Soc. Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with? Alc. To be sure.