Socrates. Yes, Phaedrus, so it is; but, in my opinion, serious discourse about them is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him
 who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other minds other words capable of continuing the process for ever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest possible limit of human happiness. Phaedrus. Yes, that is far nobler. Socrates. And now, Phaedrus, since we have agreed about these matters, we can decide the others. Phaedrus. What others? Socrates. Those which brought us to this point
 through our desire to investigate them, for we wished to examine into the reproach against Lysias as a speechwriter, See Plat. Phaedrus 257c . and also to discuss the speeches themselves and see which were the products of art and which were not. I think we have shown pretty clearly what is and what is not a work of art. Phaedrus. Yes, I thought so, too; but please recall to my mind what was said. Socrates. A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul,
 must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all this, he will not be able to speak by the method of art, so far as speech can be controlled by method, either for purposes of instruction or of persuasion. This has been taught by our whole preceding discussion. Phaedrus. Yes, certainly, that is just about our result. Socrates. How about the question whether it is a fine or a disgraceful thing to be a speaker or writer
 and under what circumstances the profession might properly be called a disgrace or not? Was that made clear a little while ago when we said— Phaedrus. What? Socrates. That if Lysias or anyone else ever wrote or ever shall write, in private, or in public as lawgiver, a political document, and in writing it believes that it possesses great certainty and clearness, then it is a disgrace to the writer, whether anyone says so, or not. For whether one be awake or asleep, ignorance of right and wrong and good and bad
 is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even if the whole mob applaud it. Phaedrus. That is true. Socrates. But the man who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much that is playful, and that no written discourse, whether in meter or in prose, deserves to be treated very seriously (and this applies also to the recitations of the rhapsodes, delivered to sway people’s minds, without opportunity for questioning and teaching),
 but that the best of them really serve only to remind us of what we know; and who thinks that only in words about justice and beauty and goodness spoken by teachers for the sake of instruction and really written in a soul is clearness and perfection and serious value, that such words should be considered the speaker’s own legitimate offspring, first the word within himself, if it be found there, and secondly
 its descendants or brothers which may have sprung up in worthy manner in the souls of others, and who pays no attention to the other words,—that man, Phaedrus, is likely to be such as you and I might pray that we ourselves may become. Phaedrus. By all means that is what I wish and pray for. Socrates. We have amused ourselves with talk about words long enough. Go and tell Lysias that you and I came down to the fountain and sacred place of the nymphs,
 and heard words which they told us to repeat to Lysias and anyone else who composed speeches, and to Homer or any other who has composed poetry with or without musical accompaniment, and third to Solon and whoever has written political compositions which he calls laws: If he has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not
 to derive his title from such writings, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them. Phaedrus. What titles do you grant them then? Socrates. I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet wise is too great and befits God alone; but the name philosopher, that is, lover of wisdom, or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man. Phaedrus. And quite appropriate. Socrates. On the other hand, he who has nothing more valuable than the things he has composed or written, turning his words up and down at his leisure,
 adding this phrase and taking that away, will you not properly address him as poet or writer of speeches or of laws? Phaedrus. Certainly. Socrates. Tell this then to your friend. Phaedrus. But what will you do? For your friend ought not to be passed by. Socrates. What friend? Phaedrus. The fair Isocrates. What message will you give him? What shall we say that he is? Socrates. Isocrates is young yet, Phaedrus; 
 however, I am willing to say what I prophesy for him. Phaedrus. What is it? Socrates. I think he has a nature above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character; so that I should not be surprised if, as he grows older, he should so excel in his present studies that all who have ever treated of rhetoric shall seem less than children; and I suspect that these studies will not satisfy him, but a more divine impulse
 will lead him to greater things; for my friend, something of philosophy is inborn in his mind. This is the message that I carry from these deities to my favorite Isocrates, and do you carry the other to Lysias, your favorite. Phaedrus. It shall be done; but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler. Socrates. Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we go? Phaedrus. Of course. Socrates. O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider
 the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure.—Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? For me that prayer is enough. Phaedrus. Let me also share in this prayer; for friends have all things in common. Socrates. Let us go.