Pro. But pleasures, and the greatest pleasures at that, when we see any one enjoying them and observe the ridiculous or utterly disgraceful element which accompanies them,
 fill us with a sense of shame; we put them out of sight and hide them, so far as possible; we confine everything of that sort to the night time, as unfit for the sight of day. Soc. Then you will proclaim everywhere, Protarchus, by messengers to the absent and by speech to those present, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor even the second, but first the eternal nature has chosen measure, moderation, fitness, and all which is to be considered similar to these. Pro. That appears to result from what has now been said. Soc. Second, then, comes proportion, beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all that belongs to that class. Pro. Yes, so it appears. Soc. And if you count mind and wisdom as the third, you will, I prophesy, not wander far from the truth. Pro. That may be. Soc. And will you not put those properties fourth which we said belonged especially to the soul—sciences, arts, and true opinions they are called—
 and say that these come after the first three, and are fourth, since they are more akin than pleasure to the good? Pro. Perhaps. Soc. And fifth, those pleasures which we separated and classed as painless, which we called pure pleasures of the soul itself, those which accompany knowledge and, sometimes, perceptions? Pro. May be. Soc. But with the sixth generation, says Orpheus, cease the rhythmic song. It seems that our discussion, too, is likely to cease with the sixth decision. 
 So after this nothing remains for us but to give our discussion a sort of head. Pro. Yes, that should be done. Soc. Come then, let us for the third time call the same argument to witness before Zeus the saviour, and proceed. Pro. What argument? Soc. Philebus declared that pleasure was entirely and in all respects the good. Pro. Apparently, Socrates, when you said the third time just now, you meant that we must take up our argument again from the beginning. Soc. Yes; but let us hear what follows. For I, perceiving the truths which I have now been detailing, and annoyed by the theory held not only by Philebus but by many thousands of others, said that mind was a far better and more excellent thing for human life than pleasure. Pro. True. Soc. But suspecting that there were many other things to be considered, I said that if anything should be found better than these two, I should support mind against pleasure in the struggle for the second place, and even the second place would be lost by pleasure. Pro. Yes, that is what you said. Soc. And next it was most sufficiently proved that each of these two was insufficient. Pro. Very true. Soc. In this argument, then, both mind and pleasure were set aside; neither of them is the absolute good, since they are devoid of self-sufficiency, adequacy, and perfection? Pro. Quite right. Soc. And on the appearance of a third competitor, better than either of these, mind is now found to be ten thousand times more akin than pleasure to the victor. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Then, according to the judgement which has now been given by our discussion, the power of pleasure would be fifth. Pro. So it seems. Soc. But not first, even if all the cattle and horses and other beasts in the world, in their pursuit of enjoyment, so assert. Trusting in them, as augurs trust in birds, the many judge that pleasures are the greatest blessings in life, and they imagine that the lusts of beasts are better witnesses than are the aspirations and thoughts inspired by the philosophic muse. Pro. Socrates, we all now declare that what you have said is perfectly true. Soc. Then you will let me go? Pro. There is still a little left, Socrates. I am sure you will not give up before we do, and I will remind you of what remains.