Pro. I think that is what we should do.

Soc. Let us assume, then, a man who possesses wisdom about the nature of justice itself, and reason in accordance with his wisdom, and has the same kind of knowledge of all other things.

Pro. Agreed.

Soc. Now will this man have sufficient knowledge, if he is master of the theory of the divine circle and sphere, but is ignorant of our human sphere and human circles, even when he uses these and other kinds of rules or patterns in building houses?

Pro. We call that a ridiculous state of intellect in a man, Socrates, which is concerned only with divine knowledge.

Soc. What? Do you mean to say that the uncertain and impure art of the false rule and circle is to be put into our mixture?

Pro. Yes, that is inevitable, if any man is ever to find his own way home.

Soc. And must we add music, which we said a little while ago was full of guesswork and imitation and lacked purity?

Pro. Yes, I think we must, if our life is to be life at all.

Soc. Shall I, then, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and hustled by a mob, give up, open the door, and let all the kinds of knowledge stream in, the impure mingling with the pure?

Pro. I do not know, Socrates, what harm it can do a man to take in all the other kinds of knowledge if he has the first.

Soc. Shall I, then, let them all flow into what Homer very poetically calls the mingling of the vales?Hom. Il. 4.453.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. They are let in; and now we must turn again to the spring of pleasure. For our original plan for making the mixture, by taking first the true parts, did not succeed; because of our love of knowledge, we let all kinds of knowledge in together before pleasure.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. So now it is time for us to consider about pleasures also, whether these, too, shall be all let loose together, or we shall let only the true ones loose at first.

Pro. It is much safer to let loose the true first.

Soc. We will let them loose, then. But what next? If there are any necessary pleasures, as there were kinds of knowledge, must we not mix them with the true?

Pro. Of course; the necessary pleasures must certainly be added.

Soc. And as we said it was harmless and useful to know all the arts throughout our life, if we now say the same of pleasures—that is, if it is advantageous and harmless for us to enjoy all pleasures throughout life—they must all form part of the mixture.

Pro. What shall we say about these pleasures, and what shall we do?

Soc. There is no use in asking us, Protarchus; we must ask the pleasures and the arts and sciences themselves about one another.

Pro. What shall we ask them?

Soc.Dear ones—whether you should be called pleasures or by any other name—would you choose to dwell with all wisdom, or with none at all? I think only one reply is possible.

Pro. What is it?

Soc. What we said before: For any class to be alone, solitary, and unalloyed is neither altogether possible nor is it profitable; but of all classes, comparing them one with another, we think the best to live with is the knowledge of all other things and, so far as is possible, the perfect knowledge of our individual selves.

Pro.Your reply is excellent, we shall tell them.

Soc. Right. And next we must turn to wisdom and mind, and question them. We shall ask them, Do you want any further pleasures in the mixture? And they might reply, What pleasures?

Pro. Quite likely.

Soc. Then we should go on to say: In addition to those true pleasures, do you want the greatest and most intense pleasures also to dwell with you? How can we want them, Socrates, they might perhaps say, since they contain countless hindrances for us, inasmuch as they disturb with maddening pleasures the souls of men in which we dwell, thereby preventing us from being born at all, and utterly destroying for the most part, through the carelessness and forgetfulness which they engender, those of our children which are born?