Soc. Those which we mentioned before. I think the proverb we ought to repeat twice and even three times that which is good 
 is an excellent one. Pro. Surely. Soc. Well then, in God’s name; I think this is the gist of our discussion. Pro. What is it? Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good for all, and the two designations good and pleasant are properly and essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one,
 but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from one another in nature, and that wisdom’s share in the good is greater than pleasure’s. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus? Pro. Yes, certainly. Soc. And furthermore, is not and was not this a point of agreement among us? Pro. What? Soc. That the nature of the good differs from all else in this respect. Pro. In what respect? Soc. That whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient. We agreed to that? Pro. We did. Soc. And then we tried in thought to separate each from the other and apply them to individual lives, pleasure unmixed with wisdom and likewise wisdom which had not the slightest alloy of pleasure? Pro. Yes. Soc. And did we think then that either of them would be sufficient for any one? Pro. By no means. Soc. And if we made any mistake at that time, let any one now take up the question again. Assuming that memory, wisdom, knowledge, and true opinion belong to the same class, let him ask whether anyone would wish to have or acquire anything whatsoever without these not to speak of pleasure, be it never so abundant or intense, if he could have no true opinion that he is pleased, no knowledge whatsoever
 of what he has felt, and not even the slightest memory of the feeling. And let him ask in the same way about wisdom, whether anyone would wish to have wisdom without any, even the slightest, pleasure rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without wisdom rather than with some wisdom. Pro. That is impossible, Socrates; it is useless to ask the same question over and over again. Soc. Then the perfect, that which is to be desired by all and is altogether good, is neither of these? Pro. Certainly not. Soc. We must, then, gain a clear conception of the good, or at least an outline of it, that we may, as we said, know to what the second place is to be assigned. Pro. Quite right. Soc. And have we not found a road which leads to the good? Pro. What road? Soc. If you were looking for a particular man and
 first found out correctly where he lived, you would have made great progress towards finding him whom you sought. Pro. Yes, certainly. Soc. And just now we received an indication, as we did in the beginning, that we must seek the good, not in the unmixed, but in the mixed life. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Surely there is greater hope that the object of our search will be clearly present in the well mixed life than in the life which is not well mixed? Pro. Far greater. Soc. Let us make the mixture, Protarchus, with a prayer to the gods,
 to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever he be who presides over the mixing. Pro. By all means. Soc. We are like wine-pourers, and beside us are fountains—that of pleasure may be likened to a fount of honey, and the sober, wineless fount of wisdom to one of pure, health-giving water—of which we must do our best to mix as well as possible. Pro. Certainly we must. Soc. Before we make the mixture, tell me: should we be most likely to succeed by mixing all pleasure with all wisdom? Pro. Perhaps. Soc. But that is not safe; and I think I can offer a plan by which we can make our mixture with less risk. Pro. What is it? Soc. We found, I believe, that one pleasure was greater than another and one art more exact than another? Pro. Certainly. Soc. And knowledge was of two kinds, one turning its eyes towards transitory things,
 the other towards things which neither come into being nor pass away, but are the same and immutable for ever. Considering them with a view to truth, we judged that the latter was truer than the former. Pro. That is quite right. Soc. Then what if we first mix the truest sections of each and see whether, when mixed together, they are capable of giving us the most adorable life, or whether we still need something more and different?