<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg010.perseus-eng2" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" resp="perseus" n="56"><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> All that would be left for us would be to conjecture and to drill the perceptions by practice and experience, with the additional use of the powers of guessing,
<milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="56"/><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="56a"/>which are commonly called arts and acquire their efficacy by practice and toil.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> That is undeniable.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Take music first;  it is full of this; it attains harmony by guesswork based on practice, not by measurement;  and flute music throughout tries to find the pitch of each note as it is produced by guess, so that the amount of uncertainty mixed up in it is great, and the amount of certainty small.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Very true.</said></p><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="56b"/><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And we shall find that medicine and agriculture and piloting and generalship are all in the same case.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Certainly.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> But the art of building, I believe, employs the greatest number of measures and instruments which give it great accuracy and make it more scientific than most arts.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> In what way?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> In shipbuilding and house-building, and many other branches of wood-working.  For the artisan uses a rule, I imagine, a lathe, compasses, a chalk-line,
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="56c"/>and an ingenious instrument called a vice.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Certainly, Socrates;  you are right.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Let us, then, divide the arts, as they are called, into two kinds, those which resemble music, and have less accuracy in their works, and those which, like building, are more exact.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Agreed.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And of these the most exact are the arts which I just now mentioned first.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> I think you mean arithmetic and the other arts you mentioned with it just now.</said></p><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="56d"/><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Certainly.  But, Protarchus, ought not these to be divided into two kinds?  What do you say?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> What kinds?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Are there not two kinds of arithmetic, that of the people and that of philosophers?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> How can one kind of arithmetic be distinguished from the other?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> The distinction is no small one, Protarchus.  For some arithmeticians reckon unequal units,
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="56e"/>for instance, two armies and two oxen and two very small or incomparably large units;  whereas others refuse to agree with them unless each of countless units is declared to differ not at all from each and every other unit.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> You are certainly quite right in saying that there is a great difference between the devotees of arithmetic, so it is reasonable to assume that it is of two kinds.</said></p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" resp="perseus" n="57"><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And how about the arts of reckoning and measuring as they are used in building and in trade when compared with philosophical geometry
<milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="57"/><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="57a"/>and elaborate computations—shall we speak of each of these as one or as two?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> On the analogy of the previous example, I should say that each of them was two.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Right.  But do you understand why I introduced this subject?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Perhaps;  but I wish you would give the answer to your question.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> This discussion of ours is now, I think, no less than when we began it, seeking a counterpart of pleasure,
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="57b"/>and therefore it has introduced the present subject and is considering whether there is one kind of knowledge purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> That is very clear;  it was evidently introduced with that object.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Well, had not the discussion already found in what preceded that the various arts had various purposes and various degrees of exactness?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Certainly.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And after having given an art a single name in what has preceded, thereby making us think that it was a single art,
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="57c"/>does not the discussion now assume that the same art is two and ask whether the art of the philosophers or that of the non-philosophers possesses the higher degree of clearness and purity?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Yes, I think that is just the question it asks.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Then what reply shall we make, Protarchus?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Socrates, we have found a marvelously great difference in the clearness of different kinds of knowledge.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> That will make the reply easier, will it not?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Yes, to be sure;  and let our reply be this, that the arithmetical and metrical arts far surpass the others and that of these
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="57d"/>the arts which are stirred by the impulse of the true philosophers are immeasurably superior in accuracy and truth about measures and numbers.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> We accept that as our judgement, and relying upon you we make this confident reply to those who are clever in straining arguments—</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> What reply?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> That there are two arts of arithmetic and two of measuring, and many other arts which, like these, are twofold in this way, but possess a single name in common.</said></p><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="57e"/><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Let us give this answer, Socrates, to those who you say are clever;  I hope we shall have luck with it.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> These, then, we say, are the most exact arts or sciences?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Certainly.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> But the art of dialectic would spurn us, Protarchus, if we should judge that any other art is preferable to her.</said></p><milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="58"/><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="58a"/><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> But what is the art to which this name belongs?</said></p></div></div></body></text></TEI>