Soc. And shall we not find them full of ineffable pleasures? Or must I remind you of the anger? Which stirs a man, though very wise, to wrath, And sweeter is than honey from the comb, Hom. Il. 18.108-109 
 and of the pleasures mixed with pains, which we find in mournings and longings? Pro. No, you need not remind me; those things occur just as you suggest. Soc. And you remember, too, how people enjoy weeping at tragedies? Pro. Yes, certainly. Soc. And are you aware of the condition of the soul at comedies, how there also we have a mixture of pain and pleasure? Pro. I do not quite understand. Soc. Indeed it is by no means easy, Protarchus, to understand such a condition under those circumstances. Pro. No at least I do not find it so. Soc. Well, then, let us take this under consideration, all the more because of its obscurity; then we can more readily understand the mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases. Pro. Please go on. Soc. Would you say that envy, which was mentioned just now, was a pain of the soul, or not? Pro. I say it is. Soc. But certainly we see the envious man rejoicing in the misfortunes of his neighbors. Pro. Yes, very much so. Soc. Surely ignorance is an evil, as is also what we call stupidity. Pro. Surely. Soc. Next, then, consider the nature of the ridiculous. Pro. Please proceed. Soc. The ridiculous is in its main aspect a kind of vice which gives its name to a condition; and it is that part of vice in general which involves the opposite of the condition mentioned in the inscription at Delphi . Pro. You mean Know thyself, Socrates? Soc. Yes; and the opposite of that, in the language of the inscription, would evidently be not to know oneself at all. Pro. Of course. Soc. Protarchus, try to divide this into three. Pro. How do you mean? I am afraid I can never do it. Soc. Then you say that I must now make the division? Pro. Yes, I say so, and I beg you to do so, besides. Soc. Must not all those who do not know themselves be affected by their condition in one of three ways? Pro. How is that? Soc. First in regard to wealth; such a man thinks he is
 richer than he is. Pro. Certainly a good many are affected in that way. Soc. And there are still more who think they are taller and handsomer than they are and that they possess better physical qualities in general than is the case. Pro. Certainly. Soc. But by far the greatest number, I fancy, err in the third way, about the qualities of, the soul, thinking that they excel in virtue when they do not. Pro. Yes, most decidedly. Soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one to which people in general lay claim, thereby filling themselves with strife and false conceit of wisdom? Pro. Yes, to be sure. Soc. And we should surely be right in calling all that an evil condition. Pro. Very much so. Soc. Then this must further be divided into two parts, if we are to gain insight into childish envy with its absurd mixture of pleasure and pain. How shall we divide it, do you say? All who have this false and foolish conceit
 of themselves fall, like the rest of mankind, into two classes: some necessarily have strength and power, others, as I believe, the reverse. Pro. Yes, necessarily. Soc. Make the division, then, on that principle; those of them who have this false conceit and are weak and unable to revenge themselves when they are laughed at you may truly call ridiculous, but those who are strong and able to revenge themselves you will define most correctly to yourself
 by calling them powerful, terrible, and hateful, for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and infamous—since whether real or feigned it injures their neighbors—but ignorance in the weak appears to us as naturally ridiculous. Pro. Quite right. But the mixture of pleasure and pain in all this is not yet clear to me. Soc. First, then, take up the nature of envy. Pro. Go on. Soc. Is envy a kind of unrighteous pain and also a pleasure? Pro. Undoubtedly. Soc. But it is neither wrong nor envious to rejoice in the misfortunes of our enemies, is it? Pro. No, of course not. Soc. But when people sometimes see the misfortunes of their friends and rejoice instead of grieving, is not that wrong? Pro. Of course it is. Soc. And we said that ignorance was an evil to every one, did we not? Pro. True. Soc. Then the false conceits of our friends concerning their wisdom, their beauty,
 and their other qualities which we mentioned just now, saying that they belong to three classes, are ridiculous when they are weak, but hateful when they are powerful. Shall we, or shall we not, affirm that, as I said just now, this state of mind when possessed in its harmless form by any of our friends, is ridiculous in the eyes of others? Pro. Certainly it is ridiculous. Soc. And do we not agree that ignorance is in itself a misfortune? Pro. Yes, a great one. Soc. And do we feel pleasure or pain when we laugh at it?