Pro. Yes, we must. Soc. Now see what there is about the pleasures which are related to certain diseases. Pro. What diseases? Soc. Repulsive diseases which the philosophers of dislike whom we mentioned utterly abominate. Pro. What are the pleasures? Soc. For instance, the relief of the itch and the like by scratching, no other treatment being required. For in Heaven’s name what shall we say the feeling is which we have in this case? Is it pleasure or pain? Pro. I think, Socrates, it is a mixed evil. Soc. I did not introduce this question on Philebus’ account; but unless we consider these pleasures and those that follow in their train, Protarchus, we can probably never settle the point at issue. Pro. Then we must attack this family of pleasures. Soc. You mean those which are mixed? Pro. Certainly. Soc. Some mixtures are concerned with the body and are in the body only, and some belong only to the soul and are in the soul; 
 and we shall also find some mingled pains and pleasures belonging both to the soul and to the body, and these are sometimes called pleasures, sometimes pains. Pro. How so? Soc. Whenever, in the process of restoration or destruction, anyone has two opposite feelings, as we sometimes are cold, but are growing warm, or are hot, but are growing cold, the desire of having the one and being free from the other, the mixture of bitter and sweet, as they say, joined with the difficulty in getting rid of the bitter,
 produces impatience and, later, wild excitement. Pro. What you say is perfectly true. Soc. And such mixtures sometimes consist of equal pains and pleasures and sometimes contain more of one or the other, do they not? Pro. Of course. Soc. In the case of the mixtures in which the pains are more than the pleasures—say the itch, which we mentioned just now, or tickling—when the burning inflammation is within and is not reached by the rubbing and scratching,
 which separate only such mixtures as are on the surface, sometimes by bringing the affected parts to the fire or to something cold we change from wretchedness to inexpressible pleasures, and sometimes the opposition between the internal and the external produces a mixture of pains and pleasures, whichever happens to preponderate; this is the result of the forcible separation of combined elements,
	 or the combination of those that were separate, and the concomitant juxtaposition of pains and pleasures. Pro. Very true. Soc. And when the pleasure is the predominant element in the mixture, the slight tincture of pain tickles a man and makes him mildly impatient, or again an excessive proportion of pleasure excites him and sometimes even makes him leap for joy; it produces in him all sorts of colors, attitudes, and paintings, and even causes great amazement and foolish shouting, does it not? Pro. Certainly. Soc. And it makes him say of himself, and others say of him, that he is pleased to death with these delights, and the more unrestrained and foolish he is, the more he always gives himself up to the pursuit of these pleasures; he calls them the greatest of all things and counts that man the happiest who lives most entirely in the enjoyment of them. Pro. Socrates, you have described admirably what happens
 in the case of most people. Soc. That may be, Protarchus, so far as concerns purely bodily pleasures in which internal and external sensations unite; but concerning the pleasures in which the soul and the body contribute opposite elements, each adding pain or pleasure to the other’s pleasure or pain, so that both unite in a single mixture—concerning these I said before that when a man is empty he desires to be filled, and rejoices in his expectation, but is pained by his emptiness, and now I add, what I did not say at that time, that in all these cases, which are innumerable,

 of opposition between soul and body, there is one single mixture of pain and pleasure. Pro. I believe you are quite right. Soc. One further mixture of pain and pleasure is left. Pro. What is it? Soc. That mixture of its own feelings which we said the soul often experiences. Pro. And what do we call this? Soc. Do you not regard anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like as pains of the soul and the soul only? Pro. I do.