Soc. And an unjust and thoroughly bad man
 is the reverse? Pro. Of course. Soc. But, as we were just now saying, every man is full of many hopes? Pro. Yes, to be sure. Soc. And there are in all of us written words which we call hopes? Pro. Yes. Soc. And also the images painted there; and often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into his possession, and in its train many pleasures; and he even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself immensely. Pro. Yes, certainly. Soc. Shall we or shall we not say that of these pictures those are for the most part true which are presented to the good, because they are friends of the gods, whereas those presented to the bad are for the most part false? Pro. Surely we must say that. Soc. Then the bad also, no less than the good, have pleasures painted in their souls, but they are false pleasures. Pro. Yes, surely. Soc. Then the bad rejoice for the most part in the false, and the good in true pleasures. Pro. That is inevitably true. Soc. According to our present view, then, there are false pleasures in the souls of men, imitations or caricatures of the true pleasures; and pains likewise. Pro. There are. Soc. We saw, you remember, that he who had an opinion at all always really had an opinion, but it was sometimes not based upon realities, whether present, past, or future. Pro. Certainly. Soc. And this it was, I believe, which created false opinion and the holding of false opinions, was it not? Pro. Yes. Soc. Very well, must we not also grant that pleasure and pain stand in the same relation to realities? Pro. What do you mean? Soc. I mean that he who feels pleasure at all in any way or manner always really feels pleasure, but it is sometimes not based upon realities, whether present or past, and often, perhaps most frequently, upon things which will never even be realities in the future. Pro. This also, Socrates, must inevitably be the case. Soc. And the same may be said of fear and anger and all that sort of thing—that they are all sometimes false? Pro. Certainly. Soc. Well, can we say that opinions become bad or good except as they become false? Pro. No. Soc. And we understand, I believe, that pleasures also
	 are not bad except by being false. Pro. No; you have said quite the reverse of the truth, Socrates; for no one would be at all likely to call pains and pleasures bad because they are false, but because they are involved in another great and manifold evil. Soc. Then of the evil pleasures which are such because of evil we will speak a little later, if we still care to do so; but of the false pleasures we must prove in another way that they exist and come into existence in us often and in great numbers; 
 for this may help us to reach our decisions. Pro. Yes, of course; that is, if such pleasures exist. Soc. But they do exist, Protarchus, in my opinion; however, until we have established the truth of this opinion, it cannot be unquestioned. Pro. Good. Soc. Then let us, like athletes, approach and grapple with this new argument. Pro. Let us do so. Soc. We said, you may remember, a little while ago,
 that when desires, as they are called, exist in us, the soul is apart from the body and separate from it in feelings. Pro. I remember; that was said. Soc. And was not the soul that which desired the opposites of the conditions of the body and the body that which caused pleasure or pain because of feeling? Pro. Yes, that was the case. Soc. Then draw the conclusion as to what takes place in these circumstances. Pro. Go on. Soc. What takes place is this: in these circumstances pleasures and pains exist at the same time and the sensations of opposite pleasures and pains are present side by side simultaneously, as was made clear just now. Pro. Yes, that is clear. Soc. And have we not also said and agreed and settled something further? Pro. What? Soc. That both pleasure and pain admit of the more and less and are of the class of the infinite. Pro. Yes, we have said that, certainly. Soc. Then what means is there of judging rightly of this? Pro. How and in what way do you mean? Soc. I mean to ask whether the purpose of our judgement of these matters in such circumstances is to recognize in each instance which of these elements is greater or smaller or more intense, comparing pain with pleasure, pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure. Pro. Certainly there are such differences, and that is the purpose of our judgement.