Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates, we call the opinion false; but nobody would ever call the actual pleasure false.

You are an eager advocate of the case of pleasure just now, Protarchus.

Oh no, I merely say what I hear.

Is there no difference, my friend, between the pleasure which is connected with right opinion and knowledge and that which often comes to each of us with falsehood and ignorance?

There is likely to be a great difference.

Then let us proceed to the contemplation of the difference between them.

Lead on as you think best.

Then this is the way I lead.

What way?

Do we agree that there is such a thing as false opinion and also as true opinion?

There is.

And, as we were saying just now, pleasure and pain often follow them—I mean true and false opinion.

Certainly.

And do not opinion and the power of forming an opinion always come to us from memory and perception?

Certainly.

Do we, then, believe that our relation to these faculties is somewhat as follows?

How?

Would you say that often when a man sees things at a distance and not very clearly, he wishes to distinguish between the things which he sees?

Yes, I should say so.

Next, then, would he not ask himself—

What?

What is that which is visible standing beside the rock under a tree? Do you not think a man might ask himself such a question if he saw such objects presented to his view?

To be sure.

And after that our gazer might reply to himself correctly It is a man?

Certainly.

Or, again, perhaps he might be misled into the belief that it was a work of some shepherds, and then he would call the thing which he saw an image.

Yes, indeed.

And if some one is with him, he might repeat aloud to his companion what he had said to himself, and thus that which we called an opinion now becomes a statement?

Certainly.

But if he is alone when he has this thought, he sometimes carries it about in his mind for a long time.

Undoubtedly.

Well, is your view about what takes place in such cases the same as mine?

What is yours?

I think the soul at such a time is like a book.

How is that?

Memory unites with the senses, and they and the feelings which are connected with them seem to me almost to write words in our souls; and when the feeling in question writes the truth, true opinions and true statements are produced in us; but when the writer within us writes falsehoods, the resulting opinions and statements are the opposite of true.

That is my view completely, and I accept it as stated.

Then accept also the presence of another workman in our souls at such a time.

What workman?

A painter, who paints in our souls pictures to illustrate the words which the writer has written.

But how do we say he does this, and when?

When a man receives from sight or some other sense the opinions and utterances of the moment and afterwards beholds in his own mind the images of those opinions and utterances. That happens to us often enough, does it not?

It certainly does.

And the images of the true opinions are true, and those of the false are false?

Assuredly.

Then if we are right about that, let us consider a further question.

What is it?

Whether this is an inevitable experience in relation to the present and the past, but not in relation to the future.

It is in the same relation to all kinds of time.

Was it not said a while ago that the pleasures and pains which belong to the soul alone might come before the pleasures and pains of the body, so that we have the pleasure and pain of anticipation, which relate to the future?

Very true.

Do the writings and pictures, then, which we imagined a little while ago to exist within us, relate to the past and present, but not to the future?

To the future especially.

Do you say to the future especially because they are all hopes relating to the future and we are always filled with hopes all our lives?

Precisely.

Well, here is a further question for you to answer.

What is it?

A just, pious, and good man is surely a friend of the gods, is he not?

Certainly.