<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg010.perseus-eng2" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" resp="perseus" n="35"><milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="35"/><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="35a"/><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Of drink, or of being filled with drink?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Of being filled, I suppose.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> The man, then, who is empty desires, as it appears, the opposite of what he feels for, being empty, he longs to be filled.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> That is very plain.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Well then, is there any source from which a man who is empty at first can gain a comprehension, whether by perception or by memory, of fulness, a thing which he does not feel at the time and has never felt before?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> It cannot be done.</said></p><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="35b"/><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And yet he who desires, desires something, we say.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Of course.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And he does not desire that which he feels;  for he is thirsty, and that is emptiness, but he desires fulness.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Yes.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Then somehow some part of him who is thirsty can apprehend fulness.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Yes, obviously.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> But it cannot be the body, for that is empty.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> True.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> The only remaining possibility is that the soul apprehends it,
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="35c"/>which it must do by means of memory;  for what other means could it employ?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> No other, I should say.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And do we understand the consequences of this argument?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> What are the consequences?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> This argument declares that we have no bodily desire.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> How so?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Because it shows that the endeavor of every living being is always towards the opposite of the actual conditions of the body.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Yes, certainly.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And the impulse which leads towards the opposite of those conditions shows that there is a memory of the opposite of the conditions.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Certainly.</said></p><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="35d"/><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And the argument, by showing that memory is that which leads us towards the objects of desire, has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and the ruling principle in every living being are of the soul.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Quite right.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> So the argument denies utterly that the body hungers or thirsts or has any such affection.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Very true.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Let us consider a further point in connection with those very affections.  For I think the purpose of the argument is to point out to us a state of life existing in them.</said></p><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="35e"/><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Of what sort of life are you speaking, and in what affections does it exist?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> In the affections of fulness and emptiness and all which pertain to the preservation and destruction of living beings, and I am thinking that if we fall into one of these we feel pain, which is followed by joy when we change to the other.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> That is true.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> And what if a man is between the two?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> How between them?</said></p></div></div></body></text></TEI>