Soc. And, again, we shall find that, on the same principle, that which is made or created differs in name only from that which comes into being, shall we not? Pro. We shall. Soc. And the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is created follows after it as it comes into being? Pro. Certainly. Soc. Then the cause and that which is the servant of the cause for the purpose of generation are not the same. Pro. Of course not. Soc. Did not the things which come into being and the things out of which they come into being furnish us all the three classes? Pro. Certainly. Soc. And that which produces all these, the cause, we call the fourth, as it has been satisfactorily shown to be distinct from the others? Pro. Yes, it is distinct. Soc. It is, then, proper, now that we have distinguished the four, to make sure that we remember them separately by enumerating them in order. Pro. Yes, certainly. Soc. The first, then, I call infinite, the second limit or finite, and the third something generated by a mixture of these two. And should I be making any mistake if I called
 the cause of this mixture and creation the fourth? Pro. Certainly not. Soc. Now what is the next step in our argument, and what was our purpose in coming to the point we have reached? Was it not this? We were trying to find out whether the second place belonged to pleasure or to wisdom, were we not? Pro. Yes, we were. Soc. And may we not, perhaps, now that we have finished with these points, be better able to come to a decision about the first and second places, which was the original subject of our discussion? Pro. Perhaps. Soc. Well then; we decided that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the victor, did we not? Pro. Yes. Soc. And do we not see what kind of life this is, and to what class it belongs? Pro. Of course we do. Soc. We shall say that it belongs to the third class; for that class is not formed by mixture of any two things, but of all the things which belong to the infinite, bound by the finite; and therefore this victorious life would rightly be considered a part of this class. Pro. Quite rightly. Soc. Well then, what of your life, Philebus, of unmixed pleasure? In which of the aforesaid classes may it properly be said to belong? But before you tell me, please answer this question. Phi. Ask your question. Soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or are they among the things which admit of more and less? Phi. Yes, they are among those which admit of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be absolute good if it were not infinite in number and degree.