In cases of illness, does not the proper combination of these elements produce health?

Certainly.

And in the acute and the grave, the quick and the slow, which are unlimited, the addition of these same elements creates a limit and establishes the whole art of music in all its perfection, does it not?

Excellent.

And again in the case of cold and hot weather, the introduction of these elements removes the excess and indefiniteness and creates moderation and harmony.

Assuredly.

And thence arise the seasons and all the beauties of our world, by mixture of the infinite with the finite?

Of course.

There are countless other things which I pass over, such as health, beauty, and strength of the body and the many glorious beauties of the soul. For this goddess, This goddess may be Μουσική (in which case ἐγγενομένη the reading of T and G, would be preferable to ἐγγενόμενα above), not music in the restricted modern sense, but the spirit of numbers and measure which underlies all music, and all the beauties of the world; or the goddess may be mentioned here in reference (and opposition) to the goddess Pleasure (12 B); she is the nameless deity who makes Pleasure and all others conform to her rules. my fair Philebus, beholding the violence and universal wickedness which prevailed, since there was no limit of pleasures or of indulgence in them, established law and order, which contain a limit. You say she did harm; I say, on the contrary, she brought salvation. What do you think, Protarchus?

What you say, Socrates, pleases me greatly.

I have spoken of these three classes, you observe.

Yes, I believe I understand; I think you mean that the infinite is one class and the finite is another class among existing things; but what you wish to designate as the third class, I do not comprehend very well.

No, because the multitude which springs up in the third class overpowers you and yet the infinite also comprised many classes, nevertheless, since they were sealed with the seal of the more and less, they were seen to be of one class.

True.

And the finite, again, did not contain many classes, nor were we disturbed about its natural unity.

Of course not.

No, not at all. And as to the third class, understand that I mean every offspring of these two which comes into being as a result of the measures created by the cooperation of the finite.

I understand.

But we said there was, in addition to three classes, a fourth to be investigated. Let us do that together. See whether you think that everything which comes into being must necessarily come into being through a cause.

Yes, I do; for how could it come into being apart from a cause?

Does not the nature of that which makes or creates differ only in name from the cause, and may not the creative agent and the cause be properly considered one?

Yes.

And, again, we shall find that, on the same principle, that which is made or created differs in name only from that which comes into being, shall we not?

We shall.

And the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is created follows after it as it comes into being?

Certainly.

Then the cause and that which is the servant of the cause for the purpose of generation are not the same.

Of course not.

Did not the things which come into being and the things out of which they come into being furnish us all the three classes?

Certainly.

And that which produces all these, the cause, we call the fourth, as it has been satisfactorily shown to be distinct from the others?

Yes, it is distinct.

It is, then, proper, now that we have distinguished the four, to make sure that we remember them separately by enumerating them in order.

Yes, certainly.

The first, then, I call infinite, the second limit or finite, and the third something generated by a mixture of these two. And should I be making any mistake if I called the cause of this mixture and creation the fourth?

Certainly not.

Now what is the next step in our argument, and what was our purpose in coming to the point we have reached? Was it not this? We were trying to find out whether the second place belonged to pleasure or to wisdom, were we not?

Yes, we were.

And may we not, perhaps, now that we have finished with these points, be better able to come to a decision about the first and second places, which was the original subject of our discussion?

Perhaps.

Well then; we decided that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the victor, did we not?

Yes.

And do we not see what kind of life this is, and to what class it belongs?

Of course we do.

We shall say that it belongs to the third class; for that class is not formed by mixture of any two things, but of all the things which belong to the infinite, bound by the finite; and therefore this victorious life would rightly be considered a part of this class.

Quite rightly.

Well then, what of your life, Philebus, of unmixed pleasure? In which of the aforesaid classes may it properly be said to belong? But before you tell me, please answer this question.

Ask your question.

Have pleasure and pain a limit, or are they among the things which admit of more and less?

Yes, they are among those which admit of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be absolute good if it were not infinite in number and degree.

Nor would pain, Philebus, be absolute evil; so it is not the infinite which supplies any element of good in pleasure; we must look for something else. Well, I grant you that pleasure and pain are in the class of the infinite but to which of the aforesaid classes, Protarchus and Philebus, can we now without irreverence assign wisdom, knowledge, and mind? I think we must find the right answer to this question, for our danger is great if we fail.

Oh Socrates, you exalt your own god.

And you your goddess, my friend. But the question calls for an answer, all the same.

Socrates is right, Philebus; you ought to do as he asks.

Did you not, Protarchus, elect to reply in my place?

Yes; but now I am somewhat at a loss, and I ask you, Socrates, to be our spokesman yourself, that we may not select the wrong representative and so say something improper.

I must do as you ask, Protarchus; and it is not difficult. But did I really, as Philebus said, embarrass you by playfully exalting my god, when I asked to what class mind and knowledge should be assigned?

You certainly did, Socrates.

Yet the answer is easy; for all philosophers agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that mind is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are right. But let us, if you please, investigate the question of its class more at length.

Speak just as you like, Socrates. Do not consider length, so far as we are concerned you cannot bore us.

Good. Then let us begin by asking a question.

What is the question?

Shall we say, Protarchus, that all things and this which is called the universe are governed by an irrational and fortuitous power and mere chance, or, on the contrary, as our forefathers said, are ordered and directed by mind and a marvellous wisdom?

The two points of view have nothing in common, my wonderful Socrates. For what you are now saying seems to me actually impious. But the assertion that mind orders all things is worthy of the aspect of the world, of sun, moon, stars, and the whole revolving universe; I can never say or think anything else about it.

Do you, then, think we should assent to this and agree in the doctrine of our predecessors, not merely intending to repeat the words of others, with no risk to ourselves, but ready to share with them in the risk and the blame, if any clever man declares that this world is not thus ordered, but is without order?

Yes, of course I do.

Then observe the argument that now comes against us.

Go on.

We see the elements which belong to the natures of all living beings, fire, water, air, and earth—or, as the storm-tossed mariners say, land in sight— in the constitution of the universe.

Certainly and we are truly storm-tossed in the puzzling cross-currents of this discussion.

Well, here is a point for you to consider in relation to each of these elements as it exists in us.

What is the point?

Each element in us is small and poor and in no way pure at all or endowed with the power which is worthy of its nature. Take one example and apply it to all. Fire, for instance, exists in us and also in the universe.

Of course.

And that which is in us is small, weak, and poor, but that which is in the universe is marvellous in quantity, beauty, and every power which belongs to fire.

What you say is very true.

Well, is the fire of the universe nourished, originated, and ruled by the fire within us, or, on the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of all living beings derive nourishment and all that from the universal fire?

That question does not even deserve an answer.

True; and you will, I fancy, say the same of the earth which is in us living creatures and that which is in the universe, and concerning all the other elements about which I asked a moment ago your answer will be the same.

Yes. Who could answer otherwise without being called a lunatic?

Nobody, I fancy. Now follow the next step. When we see that all the aforesaid elements are gathered together into a unit, do we not call them a body?

Of course.

Apply the same line of thought to that which we call the universe. It would likewise be a body, being composed of the same elements.

Quite right.

Does our body derive, obtain, and possess from that body, or that body from ours, nourishment and everything else that we mentioned just now?

That, Socrates, is another question not worth asking.

Well, is this next one worth asking? What will you say to it?

What is it?

Shall we not say that our body has a soul?

Clearly we shall.

Where did it get it, Protarchus, unless the body of the universe had a soul, since that body has the same elements as ours, only in every way superior?

Clearly it could get it from no other source.

No; for we surely do not believe, Protarchus, that of those four elements, the finite, the infinite, the combination, and the element of cause which exists in all things, this last, which gives to our bodies souls and the art of physical exercise and medical treatment when the body is ill, and which is in general a composing and healing power, is called the sum of all wisdom, and yet, while these same elements exist in the entire heaven and in great parts thereof, and area moreover, fair and pure, there is no means of including among them that nature which is the fairest and most precious of all.

Certainly there would be no sense in that.

Then if that is not the case, it would be better to follow the other line of thought and say, as we have often said, that there is in the universe a plentiful infinite and a sufficient limit, and in addition a by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called wisdom and mind.

Yes, most justly.

Surely reason and mind could never come into being without soul.

No, never.

Then in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul and a kingly mind were implanted through the power of the cause, and in other deities other noble qualities from which they derive their favorite epithets.

Certainly.

Now do not imagine, Protarchus, that this is mere idle talk of mine; it confirms the utterances of those who declared of old Anaxagoras and probably some now unknown precursors. that mind always rules the universe.

Yes, certainly.

And to my question it has furnished the reply that mind belongs to that one of our four classes which was called the cause of all. Now, you see, you have at last my answer.

Yes, and a very sufficient one and yet you answered without my knowing it.

Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes a joke is a restful change from serious talk.

You are right.