Soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure and no pleasure in the life of wisdom. For if either of them is the good, it cannot have need of anything else, and if, either be found to need anything, we can no longer regard it as our true good.

Pro. No, of course not.

Soc. Shall we then undertake to test them through you?

Pro. By all means.

Soc. Then answer.

Pro. Ask.

Soc. Would you, Protarchus, be willing to live your whole life in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

Pro. Of course I should.

Soc. Would you think you needed anything further, if you were in complete possession of that enjoyment?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. But consider whether you would not have some need of wisdom and intelligence and power of calculating your wants and the like.

Pro. Why should I? If I have enjoyment, I have everything.

Soc. Then living thus you would enjoy the greatest pleasures all your life?

Pro. Yes; why not?

Soc. But if you did not possess mind or memory or knowledge or true opinion, in the first place, you would not know whether you were enjoying your pleasures or not. That must be true, since you are utterly devoid of intellect, must it not?

Pro. Yes, it must.

Soc. And likewise, if you had no memory you could not even remember that you ever did enjoy pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present pleasure could remain with you; if you had no true opinion you could not think you were enjoying pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it, and if you were without power of calculation you would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy it in the future; your life would not be that of a man, but of a mollusc or some other shell-fish like the oyster. Is that true, or can we imagine any other result?

Pro. We certainly cannot.

Soc. And can we choose such a life?

Pro. This argument, Socrates, has made me utterly speechless for the present.

Soc. Well, let us not give in yet. Let us take up the life of mind and scrutinize that in turn.

Pro. What sort of life do you mean?

Soc. I ask whether anyone would be willing to live possessing wisdom and mind and knowledge and perfect memory of all things, but having no share, great or small, in pleasure, or in pain, for that matter, but being utterly unaffected by everything of that sort.

Pro. Neither of the two lives can ever appear desirable to me, Socrates, or, I think, to anyone else.

Soc. How about the combined life, Protarchus, made up by a union of the two?

Pro. You mean a union of pleasure with mind or wisdom?

Soc. Yes, I mean a union of such elements.

Pro. Every one will prefer this life to either of the two others—yes, every single person without exception.

Soc. Then do we understand the consequences of what we are now saying?

Pro. Certainly. Three lives have been proposed, and of two of them neither is sufficient or desirable for man or any other living being.

Soc. Then is it not already clear that neither of these two contained the good for if it did contain the good, it would be sufficient and perfect, and such as to be chosen by all living creatures which would be able to live thus all their lives; and if any of us chose anything else, he would be choosing contrary to the nature of the truly desirable, not of his own free will, but from ignorance or some unfortunate necessity.

Pro. That seems at any rate to be true.

Soc. And so I think we have sufficiently proved that Philebus’s divinity is not to be considered identical with the good.

Phi. But neither is your mind the good, Socrates; it will be open to the same objections.

Soc. My mind, perhaps, Philebus; but not so, I believe, the true mind, which is also divine; that is different. I do not as yet claim for mind the victory over the combined life, but we must look and see what is to be done about the second place; for each of us might perhaps put forward a claim, one that mind is the cause of this combined life, the other that pleasure is the cause and thus neither of these two would be the good, but one or the other of them might be regarded as the cause of the good. On this point I might keep up the fight all the more against Philebus and contend that in this mixed life it is mind that is more akin and more similar than pleasure to that, whatever it may be, which makes it both desirable and good; and from this point of view pleasure could advance no true claim to the first or even the second place. It is farther behind than the third place, if my mind is at all to be trusted at present.

Pro. Certainly, Socrates, it seems to me that pleasure has fought for the victory and has fallen in this bout, knocked down by your words. And we can only say, as it seems, that mind was wise in not laying claim to the victory; for it would have met with the same fate. Now pleasure, if she were to lose the second prize, would be deeply humiliated in the eyes of her lovers; for she would no longer appear even to them so lovely as before.

Soc. Well, then, is it not better to leave her now and not to pain her by testing her to the utmost and proving her in the wrong?

Pro. Nonsense, Socrates!

Soc. Nonsense because I spoke of paining pleasure, and that is impossible?

Pro. Not only that, but because you do not understand that not one of us will let you go yet until you have finished the argument about these matters.

Soc. Whew, Protarchus! Then we have a long discussion before us, and not an easy one, either, this time. For in going ahead to fight mind’s battle for the second place, I think I need a new contrivance—other weapons, as it were, than those of our previous discussion, though perhaps some of the old ones will serve. Must I then go on?

Pro. Of course you must.

Soc. Then let us try to be careful in making our beginning.

Pro. What kind of a beginning do you mean?

Soc. Let us divide all things that now exist in the universe into two, or rather, if you please, three classes.

Pro. Please tell us on what principle you would divide them.

Soc. Let us take some of the subjects of our present discussion.

Pro. What subjects?

Soc. We said that God revealed in the universe two elements, the infinite and the finite, did we not?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Let us, then, assume these as two of our classes, and a third, made by combining these two. But I cut a ridiculous figure, it seems, when I attempt a division into classes and an enumeration.

Pro. What do you mean, my friend?

Soc. I think we need a fourth class besides.

Pro. Tell us what it is.

Soc. Note the cause of the combination of those two and assume that as the fourth in addition to the previous three.

Pro. And then will you not need a fifth, which has the power of separation?

Soc. Perhaps; but not at present, I think. However, if we do need a fifth, you will pardon me for going after it.

Pro. Of course.

Soc. First, then, let us take three of the four and, as we see that two of these are split up and scattered each one into many, let us try, by collecting each of them again into one, to learn how each of them was both one and many.

Pro. If you could tell me more clearly about them, I might be able to follow you.

Soc. I mean, then, that the two which I select are the same which I mentioned before, the infinite and the finite. I will try to show that the infinite is, in a certain sense, many; the finite can wait.

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Consider then. What I ask you to consider is difficult and debatable; but consider it all the same. In the first place, take hotter and colder and see whether you can conceive any limit of them, or whether the more and less which dwell in their very nature do not, so long as they continue to dwell therein, preclude the possibility of any end; for if there were any end of them, the more and less would themselves be ended.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. But always, we affirm, in the hotter and colder there is the more and less.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Always, then, the argument shows that these two have no end; and being endless, they are of course infinite.

Pro. Most emphatically, Socrates.

Soc. I am glad you responded, my dear Protarchus, and reminded me that the word emphatically which you have just used, and the word gently have the same force as more and less. For wherever they are present, they do not allow any definite quantity to exist; they always introduce in every instance a comparison—more emphatic than that which is quieter, or vice versa—and thus they create the relation of more and less, thereby doing away with fixed quantity. For, as I said just now, if they did not abolish quantity, but allowed it and measure to make their appearance in the abode of the more and less, the emphatically and gently, those latter would be banished from their own proper place. When once they had accepted definite quantity, they would no longer be hotter or colder; for hotter and colder are always progressing and never stationary; but quantity is at rest and does not progress. By this reasoning hotter and its opposite are shown to be infinite.

Pro. That appears to be the case, Socrates; but, as you said, these subjects are not easy to follow. Perhaps, however, continued repetition might lead to a satisfactory agreement between the questioner and him who is questioned.

Soc. That is a good suggestion, and I must try to carry it out. However, to avoid waste of time in discussing all the individual examples, see if we can accept this as a designation of the infinite.

Pro. Accept what?

Soc. All things which appear to us to become more or less, or to admit of emphatic and gentle and excessive and the like, are to be put in the class of the infinite as their unity, in accordance with what we said a while ago, if you remember, that we ought to collect all things that are scattered and split up and impress upon them to the best of our ability the seal of some single nature.

Pro. I remember.

Soc. And the things which do not admit of more and less and the like, but do admit of all that is opposed to them—first equality and the equal, then the double, and anything which is a definite number or measure in relation to such a number or measure— all these might properly be assigned to the class of the finite. What do you say to that?

Pro. Excellent, Socrates.

Soc. Well, what shall we say is the nature of the third class, made by combining these two?

Pro. You will tell me, I fancy, by answering your own question.

Soc. Nay, a god will do so, if any god will give ear to my prayers.

Pro. Pray, then, and watch.

Soc. I am watching; and I think, Protarchus, one of the gods has this moment been gracious unto me.

Pro. What do you mean, and what evidence have you?

Soc. I will tell you, of course. Just follow what I say.

Pro. Say on.

Soc. We spoke just now of hotter and colder, did we not?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Add to them drier and wetter, more and less, quicker and slower, greater and smaller, and all that we assigned before to the class which unites more and less.

Pro. You mean the class of the infinite?

Soc. Yes. Mix with that the second class, the offspring of the limit.

Pro. What class do you mean?

Soc. The class of the finite, which we ought just now to have reduced to unity, as we did that of the infinite. We have not done that, but perhaps we shall even now accomplish the same end, if these two are both unified and then the third class is revealed.

Pro. What third class, and what do you mean?

Soc. The class of the equal and double and everything which puts an end to the differences between opposites and makes them commensurable and harmonious by the introduction of number.

Pro. I understand. I think you mean that by mixture of these elements certain results are produced in each instance.

Soc. Yes, you are right.

Pro. Go on.