Pro. I mean puzzling us and asking questions to which we cannot at the moment give a satisfactory answer. Let us not imagine that the end of our present discussion is a mere puzzling of us all, but if we cannot answer, you must do so; for you gave us a promise. Consider, therefore, whether you yourself must distinguish the kinds of pleasure and knowledge or will let that go, in case you are able and willing to make clear in some other way the matters now at issue among us. Soc. I need no longer anticipate anything terrible, since you put it in that way; for the words in case you are willing relieve me of all fear. And besides, I think some god has given me a vague recollection. Pro. How is that, and what is the recollection about? Soc. I remember now having heard long ago in a dream, or perhaps when I was awake, some talk about pleasure and wisdom to the effect that neither of the two is the good, but some third thing, different from them and better than both. 
 However, if this be now clearly proved to us, pleasure is deprived of victory for the good would no longer be identical with it. Is not that true? Pro. It is. Soc. And we shall have, in my opinion, no longer any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasure. But the progress of the discussion will make that still clearer. Pro. Excellent! Just go on as you have begun. Soc. First, then, let us agree on some further small points. Pro. What are they? Soc. Is the nature of the good necessarily perfect
 or imperfect? Pro. The most perfect of all things, surely, Socrates. Soc. Well, and is the good sufficient? Pro. Of course; so that it surpasses all other things in sufficiency. Soc. And nothing, I should say, is more certain about it than that every intelligent being pursues it, desires it, wishes to catch and get possession of it, and has no interest in anything in which the good is not included. Pro. There is no denying that. Soc. Let us, then, look at the life of pleasure and the life of wisdom separately and consider and judge them. Pro. How do you mean?