<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg010.perseus-eng2" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" resp="perseus" n="13"><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Yes, my friend, and color is like color in so far as every one of them is a color they will all be the same, yet we all recognize that black is not only different from white, but is its exact opposite.  And so, too, figure is like figure;  they are all one in kind but the parts of the kind are in some instances absolutely opposed to each other,
<milestone unit="page" resp="Stephanus" n="13"/><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="13a"/>and in other cases there is endless variety of difference;  and we can find many other examples of such relations.  Do not, therefore, rely upon this argument, which makes all the most absolute opposites identical.  I am afraid we shall find some pleasures the opposites of other pleasures.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Perhaps;  but why will that injure my contention?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Because I shall say that, although they are unlike, you apply to them a different designation.  For you say that all pleasant things are good. Now no argument contends
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="13b"/>that pleasant things are not pleasant;  but whereas most of them are bad and only some are good, as we assert, nevertheless you call them all good, though you confess, if forced to it by argument, that they are unlike.  Now what is the identical element which exists in the good and bad pleasures alike and makes you call them all a good?</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> What do you mean, Socrates?  Do you suppose anyone who asserts that the good is pleasure will concede, or will endure to hear you say, that some pleasures are good
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="13c"/>and others bad?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> But you will concede that they are unlike and in some instances opposed to each other.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> Not in so far as they are pleasures.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Here we are again at the same old argument, Protarchus, and we shall presently assert that one pleasure is not different from another, but all pleasures are alike, and the examples just cited do not affect us at all, but we shall behave and talk just like the most worthless
<milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="13d"/>and inexperienced reasoners.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> In what way do you mean?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Why, if I have the face to imitate you and to defend myself by saying that the utterly unlike is most completely like that which is most utterly unlike it, I can say the same things you said, and we shall prove ourselves to be excessively inexperienced, and our argument will be shipwrecked and lost.  Let us, then, back her out, and perhaps if we start fair again we may come to an agreement.</said></p><milestone unit="section" resp="Stephanus" n="13e"/><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> How?  Tell me.</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Assume, Protarchus, that I am questioned in turn by you.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> What question do I ask?</said></p><p><said who="#Socrates"><label>Soc.</label> Whether wisdom and knowledge and intellect and all the things which I said at first were good, when you asked me what is good, will not have the same fate as this argument of yours.</said></p><p><said who="#Protarchus"><label>Pro.</label> How is that?</said></p></div></div></body></text></TEI>