Y. Soc. Well, Stranger, it looks as though our account of the statesman were complete now. Str. That would be a fine thing for us, Socrates. But not you alone must think so; I must think so, too, in agreement with you. As a matter of fact, however, in my opinion our figure of the king is not yet perfect, but like statue-makers who sometimes in their misapplied enthusiasm make too numerous and too large additions and thus delay the completion of their several works,
 we too, at this time, wishing to make quick progress, and also to make clear in a grand style the error of our previous course, and, moreover, fancying that the use of great illustrations was proper in the case of a king, have taken up a marvellous mass of myth and have consequently been obliged to use a greater part of it than we should. So we have made our discourse too long and after all have never made an end of the tale,
 but our talk, just like a picture of a living creature, seems to have a good enough outline, but not yet to have received the clearness that comes from pigments and the blending of colors. And yet it is more fitting to portray any living being by speech and argument than by painting or any handicraft whatsoever to persons who are able to follow argument; but to others it is better to do it by means of works of craftsmanship. Y. Soc. That is true; but explain wherein you think our exposition is still deficient. Str. It is difficult, my dear fellow, to set forth any of the greater ideas, except by the use of examples; for it would seem that each of us knows everything that he knows as if in a dream and then again, when he is as it were awake, knows nothing of it all. Y. Soc. What do you mean by that? Str. I seem at present in absurd fashion to have touched upon our experience in regard to knowledge. Y. Soc. In what respect? Str. Why, my friend, the very example I employ requires another example. i.e. the nature of example is to be explained below by means of an example. The example of the letters of the alphabet is employed also in the Plat. Theaet. 202 ff , but the Stranger cannot properly refer to that, as he was not present at the time. Or is this a dramatic slip on Plato’s part? 
 Y. Soc. Indeed? What is it? Don’t hesitate to tell on my account. Str. I will tell, since you on your part are prepared to listen. We know that children, when they are just getting some knowledge of letters— Y. Soc. Well? Str. Recognize the several letters well enough in the short and easy syllables, and can make correct statements about them. Y. Soc. Yes, of course. Str. And then again in other syllables they are in doubt about those same letters, and err in opinion and speech about them. Y. Soc. Yes, certainly. Str. Would not the easiest and best way to lead them to the letters which they do not yet know be this? Y. Soc. What? Str. To lead them first to those cases in which they had correct opinions about these same letters and then to lead them and set them beside the groups which they did not yet recognize
 and by comparing them to show that their nature is the same in both combinations alike, and to continue until the letters about which their opinions are correct have been shown in juxtaposition with all those of which they are ignorant. Being shown in this way they become examples There is here a play on the words παρα-τιθέμενα δειχθῇ, δειχθέντα δέ, παρα-δείγματα Placed beside, they are shown and being shown, they become paradigms, i.e. objects of comparison, i.e. examples. and bring it about that every letter is in all syllables always called by the same name, either by differentiation from the other letters,
 in case it is different, or because it is the same. Y. Soc. Certainly. Str. Is this, then, a satisfactory definition, that an example is formed when that which is the same in some second unconnected thing is rightly conceived and compared with the first, so that the two together form one true idea? Y. Soc. Evidently. Str. Can we wonder, then, that our soul, whose nature involves it in the same uncertainty about the letters or elements of all things,
 is sometimes in some cases firmly grounded in the truth about every detail, and again in other cases is all at sea about everything, and somehow or other has correct opinions about some combinations, and then again is ignorant of the same things when they are transferred to the long and difficult syllables of life? Y. Soc. Surely we need not wonder at that. Str. No; for could anyone, my friend, who begins with false opinion, ever attain to even a small
 part of truth and acquire wisdom? Y. Soc. No; it is hardly possible. Str. Then if this is the case, would it be a bad thing if you and I first tried to see in another small and partial example the nature of example in general, with the intention of transferring afterwards the same figurative method from lesser things to the most exalted eminence of the king, and trying by means of an example to become acquainted in a scientific way with the management of states, in order that this may be waking knowledge for us, not dream knowledge? Y. Soc. That is a very good idea. Str. Then we must take up our former argument again, and since there are countless others who contend that they, rather than the royal class, have the care of states, we must accordingly remove all these and isolate the king; and, as we said, to accomplish this we need an example. Y. Soc. Certainly. Str. What example could we apply which is very small, but has the same kind of activity as statesmanship and would enable us satisfactorily to discover that which we seek?
 What do you say, Socrates, if we have nothing else at hand, to taking at random the art of weaving, and, if you please, not the whole of that? For I fancy the art of weaving wool will be enough; if we choose that part only it will probably furnish us with the illustration we desire. Y. Soc. Agreed. Str. Then just as we divided each subject before by cutting off parts from parts,
 why not now apply the same process to the art of weaving and, by going through all the steps as briefly as we possibly can, arrive quickly at that which serves our present purpose? Y. Soc. What do you mean? Str. I will answer you by actually going through the process. Y. Soc. Excellent Str. Well, then, all things which we make or acquire are for the sake of doing something or else they are for defence against suffering; and of the defensive class some are spells and antidotes, both divine and human, and some are material defences;
 and of the material defences some are equipment for war and some are protections; and of protections some are screens and some are defences against heat and cold; and such defences are either shelters or coverings; and coverings are either rugs to spread under us or wrappings to wrap round us; and wrappings are either all of one piece or composed of several pieces;
 and of the composite garments some are stitched and others put together without stitching; and of the unstitched some are made of the fibres of plants and some are of hair; and of those made with hair some are stuck together with liquids and cement and others are fastened without any such extraneous matter. Now to these protective coverings made of materials fastened without extraneous matter we give the name of clothes;
 and just as we called the art statecraft which was concerned with the state, so we shall call the art concerned with clothes, from the nature of its activity, clothes-making, shall we not? And may we say further that weaving, in so far as the greatest part of it is, as we saw, concerned with the making of clothes, differs in name only from this art of clothes-making, just as in the other case the royal art differed from statecraft? Y. Soc. That is perfectly correct. Str. Let us next reflect that a person might think that this description of the art of weaving was satisfactory,
 because he cannot understand that it has not yet been distinguished from the closely co-operative arts, though it has been separated from many other kindred arts. Y. Soc. What kindred arts? Str. You do not seem to have followed what I have been saying; so I think I had better go back again and begin at the end. For if you understand what I mean by kinship, we distinguished from clothing something akin to it a moment ago when we separated rugs from it by the distinction between spreading under and wrapping round. Y. Soc. I understand. Str. And we removed the entire manufacture of cloth made from flax and broom-cords and all that we just now called vegetable fibres; and then, too, we separated off the process of felting and the kind of joining that employs piercing and sewing, most important of which is the shoemaker’s art. Y. Soc. Yes, to be sure. Str. And we separated off the art of making coverings of leather in single pieces and all the arts of making shelters, which we find in house-building and carpentering in general
 and in other methods of protection against water, and all the arts which furnish protection against theft and acts of violence, the arts, that is to say, of making lids and constructing doors, which are regarded as parts of the joiner’s art; and we cut off the armorer’s art, which is a section of the great and various function of making defences; and at the very beginning we cut off the whole art of magic which is concerned with antidotes and spells, and we have left, as it would seem, just the art we were seeking, which furnishes protection from the weather, manufactures a defence of wool, and is called the art of weaving. Y. Soc. That seems to be the case. Str. But, my boy, this is not yet completely stated; for the man who is engaged in the first part of the making of clothes appears to do something the opposite of weaving. Y. Soc. How so? Str. The process of weaving is, I take it, a kind of joining together. Y. Soc. Yes. Str. But the first part I refer to is a separation of what is combined and matted together. Y. Soc. What do you mean? Str. The work of the carder’s art. Or shall we have the face to say that carding is weaving and the carder is a weaver? Y. Soc. No, certainly not. Str. And surely if we say the art of making the warp or the woof is the art of weaving,
 we are employing an irrational and false designation. Y. Soc. Of course. Str. Well then, shall we say that the whole arts of fulling and mending are no part of the care and treatment of clothes, or shall we declare that these also are entirely included in the art of weaving? Y. Soc. By no means. Str. But surely all these will contest the claim of the art of weaving in the matter of the treatment and the production of clothes; they will grant that the part of weaving is the most important, but will claim that their own parts are of some importance, too. Y. Soc. Yes, certainly. Str. Then we must believe that besides these the arts which produce the tools by means of which the works of weaving are accomplished will claim to be collaborators in every work of weaving. Y. Soc. Quite right. Str. Will our definition of the art of weaving (I mean the part of it we selected) be satisfactory if we say that of all the activities connected with woollen clothing it is the noblest and the greatest?
 Or would that, although it contains some truth, yet lack clearness and completeness until we separate from weaving all these other arts? Y. Soc. You are right. Str. Then shall our next move be to do this, that our discussion may proceed in due order? Y. Soc. Certainly. Str. First, then, let us observe that there are two arts involved in all production. Y. Soc. What are they? Str. The one is a contingent cause, the other is the actual cause. Y. Soc. What do you mean? Str. Those arts which do not produce the actual thing in question,
 but which supply to the arts which do produce it the tools without which no art could ever perform its prescribed work, may be called contingent causes, and those which produce the actual thing are causes. Y. Soc. At any rate, that is reasonable. Str. Next, then, shall we designate all the arts which produce spindles, shuttles, and the various other tools that partake in the production of clothing as contingent causes, and those which treat and manufacture the clothing itself as causes? Y. Soc. Quite right.