Theaet. I will, to the best of my ability. Str. Theaetetus sits. It isn’t a long sentence, is it? Theaet. No, it is fairly short. Str. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is. Theaet. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject. Str. And how about this sentence? Theaet. What one? Str. Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies. Theaet. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject. Str. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality. Theaet. Yes. Str. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences? Theaet. One is false, I suppose, the other true. Str. The true one states facts as they are about you. Theaet. Certainly. Str. And the false one states things that are other than the facts. Theaet. Yes. Str. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were. Theaet. Yes, that is pretty much what it does. Str. And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not. Theaet. To be sure. Str. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence. Theaet. At any rate we just now agreed on that point. Str. And secondly it has a subject. Theaet. Yes. Str. And if you are not the subject, there is none. Theaet. Certainly not. Str. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible. Theaet. Quite right. Str. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse. Theaet. Yes, very truly. Str. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true? Theaet. How is it plain? Str. You will understand more easily if you first grap their natures
 and the several differences between them. Theaet. Give me an opportunity. Str. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true? Theaet. Certainly. Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech? Theaet. True. Str. And in speech we know there is just— Theaet. What? Str. Affirmation and negation Theaet. Yes, we know that. Str. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion? Theaet. Certainly not. Str. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy? Theaet. No. Str. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought,
 and what we mean when we say it seems is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false. Theaet. Certainly. Str. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task? Theaet. Yes, I see. Str. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; 
 for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes. Theaet. What divisions? Str. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic. See Plat. Theaet. 235d ff Theaet. Yes. Str. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned. Theaet. You are right. Str. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image
 nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way. Theaet. True. Str. But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind. Theaet. Yes, it is possible. Str. And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class. Theaet. Yes. Str. Then let us try again; let us divide in two
 the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first
 to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method. Theaet. Right. Str. We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not? See Plat. Theaet. 219 Theaet. Yes. Str. And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art? Theaet. Certainly. Str. But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; 
 for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree? Theaet. By all means. Str. Then let us first assume two parts of productive art. Theaet. What are they? Str. The divine and the human. Theaet. I don’t yet understand. Str. We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before. Theaet. Yes, we remember. Str. There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God’s workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief— Theaet. What belief? Str. That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God? Theaet. I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view. Str. Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines,
 without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine. Theaet. Quite right. Str. Now that there are two, divide each of them again. Theaet. How?