For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy, The English word fancy, though etymologically identical with the Greek φαντασία, has lost the close connection with seeming (φαίνεσθαι) which the Greek retains. The Greek word is therefore more comprehensive than the English, denoting that which appears to be, whether as the result of imagination or of sensation. Cf. 235 D ff. in order that when they are made clear we may perceive that they participate in not-being, and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.

It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist—that he was a hard kind of creature to catch—is true; for he seems to have no end of defences, Perhaps a sort of pun is intended, for πρόβλημα was already beginning to have the meaning of problem. and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defence, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to speech; and after this, perhaps, there will be another line, and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.

No one should be discouraged, Theaetetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others—if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is, before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defences would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.

Good.

First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.

Very well.

Then let us now investigate names, just a we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.

What do we need to understand about names?

Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

Evidently the last; some will and some will not.

This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and mean something do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.

How so, and what do you mean by that?

What I supposed you had in mind when you assented; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.

How so?

One called nouns, the other verbs. The science of language, in all its branches, was young in the time of Plato. Words of general meaning were necessarily used in a technical sense. So here ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are used as parts of grammatical terminology in the sense of verb and noun, though Plato elsewhere employs them with their ordinary meanings. Similarly the distinction between vowels and consonants (Plat. Theaet. 203; cf. Plat. Soph. 253) was at least relatively new, as was that between the active and the passive voice. How important Plato’s part was in the development of linguistic study can no longer be accurately determined.

Define each of them.

The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.

Yes.

And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.

Exactly.

Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.

I do not understand that.

I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.

In what way?

For instance, walks, runs, sleeps and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.

No, of course not.

And again, when lion, stag, horse, and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.

What do you mean by that?

When one says a man learns, you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?

Yes.

For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.

That was right.

So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.

Certainly.

Now there is another little point.

What is it?

A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.

True.

And it must also be of some quality, must it not?

Of course.

Now let us pay attention to each other.

Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.

Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which a action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you tell me.

I will, to the best of my ability.

Theaetetus sits. It isn’t a long sentence, is it?

No, it is fairly short.

Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

And how about this sentence?

What one?

Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies.

Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.

But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.

Yes.

Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?

One is false, I suppose, the other true.

The true one states facts as they are about you.

Certainly.

And the false one states things that are other than the facts.

Yes.

In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.

Yes, that is pretty much what it does.

And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.

To be sure.

Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.

At any rate we just now agreed on that point.

And secondly it has a subject.

Yes.

And if you are not the subject, there is none.

Certainly not.

And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

Quite right.

Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

Yes, very truly.

Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

How is it plain?

You will understand more easily if you first grap their natures and the several differences between them.

Give me an opportunity.

Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

Certainly.

But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

True.

And in speech we know there is just—

What?

Affirmation and negation

Yes, we know that.

Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?

Certainly not.

And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?

No.

Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say it seems is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

Certainly.

Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?

Yes, I see.

Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.

What divisions?

We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic. See Plat. Theaet. 235d ff

Yes.

And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.

You are right.

And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.

True.

But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.

Yes, it is possible.

And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.

Yes.

Then let us try again; let us divide in two the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.

Right.

We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not? See Plat. Theaet. 219

Yes.

And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?

Certainly.

But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?

By all means.

Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.

What are they?

The divine and the human.

I don’t yet understand.

We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.

Yes, we remember.

There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God’s workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief—

What belief?

That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?

I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.

Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines, without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.

Quite right.

Now that there are two, divide each of them again.

How?