But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.

Yes, it exists.

Now motion again is other than the same.

You’re about right.

Therefore it is not the same.

No, it is not.

But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.

Certainly.

Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.

Yes, certainly.

Then even if absolute motion partook in any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?

It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.

And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature. See Plat. Theaet. 251e ff

Yes, of course.

Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?

Inevitably.

Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.

True.

Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?

How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.

Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?

Yes, most fearlessly.

It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?

That is perfectly clear.

In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.

Yes, I suppose so.

And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number. Being is many, for each and every thing in all the classes is; but not-being is infinite, for not only is it true that everything in each of the classes is not, but not-being extends also to all conceptions which do not and cannot have any reality.

So it seems.

Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

Yes, it must.

And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

That is not far from the truth.

Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step. i.e., if he will not accept our proof that being is not, etc., he must disprove our arguuents respecting the participation of idea in one another, and then proceed to draw his inference.

That is very fair.

Then here is a point to consider.

What is it?

When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

What do you mean?

For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

No, of course not.

Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle not The two particles οὐ and μή in Greek. indicates something different from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

Certainly.

Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

What is it?

It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

What do you mean?

Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

Yes, certainly.

And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

There is.

Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

Now, then, tell me something more.

What?

Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

Yes.

Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

Quite right.

Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

Not at all.

Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?

No less truly.

And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?

Of course.

And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.

Of course.

Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.

That is perfectly clear.

Then what shall we call this?

Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.

And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?

None whatever.

Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?

What do you mean?

We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.

How so?

Because he says somewhere:Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is;Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation,Parmenides Fr. 7.1

Yes, that is what he says.

But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.

And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.

Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable or totally incapable of definition. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being. But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.

True.

And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.

What is it?

What I have spoken of before—the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other, and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument,—all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.

Exactly so.

For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

Why so?

The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another. The denial, that is to say, of all the interrelations of ideas leads to purely negative results. Examples of this are the exclusive antithesis of being and not-being and the mutual exclusion of rest and motion. The difficulty is solved at once when we recognize that positive and negative are necessarily interwoven in the nature of things, that the negative has only a relative existence and is not the opposite of the positive, but only different from it.

True.

Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

What was our object?

Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.

That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.

Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.

What line?

We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

Yes.

So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

Why?

If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

So it is.

But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

Yes.

And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.

Of course.

But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

Yes, so it was.

But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art, in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place.