But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

Very true.

But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

Why?

Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.

Yes, it must.

But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.

I understand.

Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?

It is a hard choice that you offer me.

That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.

Yes.

And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.

Certainly.

And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.

So it will.

And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.

Yes.

But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence

What do you mean?

That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

That certainly seems to be true.

And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

Precisely.

And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connection with whatever has previously been said.

Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being The Ionic philosophers, the Eleatics, Heracleitus, Empedocles, the Megarians, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Antisthenes all discussed the problem of being and not-being.; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

How so?

Some of them The atomists (Leucippus, Democritus, and their followers), who taught that nothing exists except atoms and the void. Possibly there is a covert reference to Aristippus who was, like Plato, a pupil of Socrates. drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

True.

Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.

How shall we get it?

It is comparatively easy to get it from those who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.

What way?

Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.

Quite right.

Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.

I will do so.

Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

Of course they do.

And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?

Certainly.

Giving to soul a place among things which exist?

Yes.

Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

Of course.

And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

Yes, they agree to this also.

But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

Yes, they say that.

Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?

They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon’s teeth This refers to the story of Cadmus, who killed a dragon and then sowed its teeth, from which sprang fierce warriors to be his companions. Born of the dragon’s teeth and of earth, they would naturally be of the earth, earthy. among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

That is pretty nearly what they believe.

Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exit. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power.

Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.