Str. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false,
 if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are. Theaet. In what other way could a statement be made false? Str. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus? Theaet. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; 
 for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that. Str. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers. Theaet. Very true. Str. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them,
 and they are, if I may say so, infinite. Theaet. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case. Str. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now? Theaet. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow. Str. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his? Theaet. Of course I will. Str. I have another still more urgent request to make of you. Theaet. What is it? Str. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide. Theaet. What do you mean? Str. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not. Theaet. It is plain that some such contention is necessary. Str. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements
 are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous. Theaet. Very true. Str. And so we must take courage and attack our father’s theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up. Theaet. But nothing in the world must prevent us. Str. Then I have a third little request to make of you. Theaet. You have only to utter it. Str. I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now. Theaet. Yes, so you did. Str. I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once
 reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the refutation, if I succeed in it. Theaet. I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned. Str. Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this. Theaet. What way? Str. We must first examine the points which now seem clear,
 lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly. Theaet. Express your meaning more clearly. Str. It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly. Theaet. How so? Str. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes
 become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage. This refers apparently to Pherecydes and the early lonians. And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian Heracleitus and his followers. and later some Sicilian Empedocles and his disciples. Muses reflected
 that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship. Str. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite,
 and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence. Theaet. What is that? Str. That they paid too little attention and consideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them,
 or whether we are left behind. Theaet. What do you mean? Str. When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven’s sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term not-being, which now perplexes us. But you see what a slough of perplexity we are in about it now. Theaet. Yes, I see. Str. And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both. Theaet. Perhaps. Str. And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking. Theaet. Certainly. Str. We will consider most of them
 later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered. Theaet. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term being, and see what those who use it think it signifies? Str. You have caught my meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes: Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them
 when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this being (or are ) of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two being you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases In both cases, i.e. whether you say that one only is or that both are, they would both be one, namely being. they would pretty certainly be one and not two. Theaet. True. Str. Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being? Theaet. Perhaps. Str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one. Theaet. You are perfectly right. Str. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say being. For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.—
 If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper? Theaet. Not in the least. Str. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one The Eleatic Zeno and his school. what they mean when they say being ? Theaet. Of course we must. Str. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not? Theaet. Yes. Str. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything? Theaet. Yes. Str. Is it what you call one, using two names for the same thing, or how is this? Theaet. What is their next answer, Stranger? Str. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other. Theaet. Why not? Str. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity. Theaet. Of course it is. Str. And in general there would be no sense in accepting
 the statement that a name has any existence. Theaet. Why? Str. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities. Theaet. Yes. Str. And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else. Theaet. True. Str. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name. In other words, one, considered as a word, will be the name of unity, but considered as a reality, it will be the unity of which the word one is the name. The sentence is made somewhat difficult of comprehension, doubtless for the purpose of indicating the confusion caused by the identification of the name wlth the thing. Theaet. Necessarily. Str. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it? Theaet. Of course they will and do say it is the same. Str. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says, On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that, Parmenides Fr. 8.43 then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not? Theaet. Certainly. Str. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole. Theaet. Very true. Str. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity? Theaet. Why? Str. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts. Theaet. Yes, it must. Str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason. Theaet. I understand. Str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all? Theaet. It is a hard choice that you offer me. Str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one. Theaet. Yes. Str. And further, if being is not a whole through
 having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being. Theaet. Certainly. Str. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being. Theaet. So it will. Str. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature. Theaet. Yes. Str. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing
 it could not even have ever come into existence Theaet. What do you mean? Str. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being. Theaet. That certainly seems to be true. Str. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole. Theaet. Precisely. Str. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties,
 will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one. Theaet. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connection with whatever has previously been said.