Str. Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller
 and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand. Theaet. Certainly. Str. So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not? Theaet. Certainly. Str. That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not? Theaet. Yes. Str. And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making? Theaet. It is to be so called. Str. Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavorable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance? Theaet. Certainly. Str. And this is very common in painting
 and in all imitation? Theaet. Of course. Str. And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be fantastic art, would it not? Theaet. By all means. Str. These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic. Theaet. You are right. Str. But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly. 
 The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him. Theaet. So it seems. Str. Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent? Theaet. What do you mean, and why did you say that? Str. We are really, my dear friend, engaged in
 a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved
 in contradiction. Theaet. Why? Str. This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse: Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is; But keep your mind from this way of investigation. Parmenides Fr. 7 
 So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if it’s all the same to you. Theaet. Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued; follow your own course, and take me along with you. Str. Very well, then. Now tell me; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being? Theaet. Of course. Str. If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but
 seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question To what is the designation not-being to be applied? how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object? Theaet. That is a difficult question; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable. Str. But this is clear, anyhow, that the term not-being cannot be applied to any being. Theaet. Of course not. Str. And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either. Theaet. How could it? Str. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word something of some being, for to speak of something in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not? Theaet. Yes, it is. Str. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing? Theaet. Yes. Str. And you will agree that something or some in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many. Theaet. Of course. Str. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing. Theaet. Quite necessarily. Str. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say not-being does not speak at all? Theaet. The argument could go no further in perplexity. Str. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter. Theaet. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak. Str. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is? Theaet. Of course. Str. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed? Theaet. Certainly not. Str. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are. Theaet. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be. Str. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being. Theaet. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows. Str. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number? Theaet. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions. Str. When we say things which are not, do we not attribute
 plurality to them? Theaet. Certainly. Str. And in saying a thing which is not, do we not equally attribute the singular number? Theaet. Obviously. Str. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being. Theaet. Very true. Str. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational? Theaet. Absolutely. Str. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject. Theaet. But is there a still greater one that we can mention? Str. Why, my dear fellow, don’t you see, by the very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself? Theaet. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly. Str. You must not look for more clearness in me; 
 for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say that which is not. You understand surely? Theaet. Yes. Str. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me? Theaet. Yes, of course.