SOC. Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be able in reply

 
to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements. THEAET. As for example, Socrates? SOC. As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, a hundred pieces of wood in a wagon. Hes. WD 456 Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke. THEAET. Certainly. SOC. But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables,
 
holding a right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe, is what was said before. THEAET. Yes, it was. SOC. So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that he who can give an account of its essential nature
 
in terms of those one hundred parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place of mere opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements. THEAET. Do you agree to that, Socrates? SOC. If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational,
 
tell me so, that we may examine the question. THEAET. Certainly I accept it. SOC. Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes one thing and sometimes another? THEAET. Not at all, by Zeus. SOC. Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others did just that? THEAET. Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter
 
and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another? SOC. That is what I mean. THEAET. By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that those have knowledge who are in that condition.