Socrates. Up to this point, as I said just now, many men agree about justice ( δίκαιον );
 and I, Hermogenes, being very much in earnest about it, have persistently asked questions and have been told in secret teachings that this is justice, or the cause—for that through which creation takes place is a cause—and some one told me that it was for this reason rightly called Zeus ( Δία ). But when, after hearing this, I nevertheless ask them quietly, What then, my most excellent friend, if this is true, is justice? they think I am asking too many questions and am leaping over the trenches. A trench was the limit of the leap for the pentathletes. 
 They say I have been told enough; they try to satisfy me by saying all sorts of different things, and they no longer agree. For one says the sun is justice, for the sun alone superintends all things, passing through and burning ( διαϊόντα καὶ καίοντα ) them. Then when I am pleased and tell this to some one, thinking it is a fine answer, he laughs at me and asks if I think there is no justice among men when the sun has set. So I beg him to tell me what he thinks it is,
 and he says Fire. But this is not easy to understand. He says it is not actual fire, but heat in the abstract that is in the fire. Another man says he laughs at all these notions, and that justice is what Anaxagoras says it is, mind; for mind, he says, is ruled only by itself, is mixed with nothing, orders all things, and passes through them. Then, my friend, I am far more perplexed than before I undertook to learn about the nature of justice.
 But I think the name—and that was the subject of our investigation—was given for the reasons I have mentioned. Hermogenes. I think, Socrates, you must have heard this from some one and are not inventing it yourself. Socrates. And how about the rest of my talk? Hermogenes. I do not at all think you had heard that. Socrates. Listen then; perhaps I may deceive you into thinking that all I am going to say is my own. What remains to consider after justice? I think we have not yet discussed courage.
 It is plain enough that injustice ( ἀδικία ) is really a mere hindrance of that which passes through ( τοῦ διαϊόντος , but the word ἀδρεία (courage) implies that courage got its name in battle, and if the universe is flowing, a battle in the universe can be nothing else than an opposite current or flow ( ῥοή ). Now if we remove the delta from the word ἀνδρεία , the word ἀνρεία signifies exactly that activity. Socrates. Of course it is clear that not the current opposed to every current is courage, but only that opposed to the current which is contrary to justice;
 for otherwise courage would not be praised. The words ἄρρεν (male) and ἀνήρ (man) refer, like ἀνδρεία , to the upward ( ἄνω ) current or flow. The word γυνή (woman) seems to me to be much the same as γονή (birth). I think θῆλυ (female) is derived from θηλή (teat); and is not θηλή , Hermogenes, so called because it makes things flourish ( τεθηλέναι ), like plants wet with showers? Hermogenes. Very likely, Socrates. Socrates. And again, the word θάλλειν (flourish) seems to me to figure the rapid and sudden growth of the young.
 Something of that sort the namegiver has reproduced in the name, which he compounded of θεῖν (run) and ἅλλεσθαι (jump). You do not seem to notice how I rush along outside of the race-course, when I get on smooth ground. But we still have plenty of subjects left which seem to be serious. Hermogenes. True. Socrates. One of which is to see what the word τέχνη (art, science) means. Hermogenes. Certainly. Socrates. Does not this denote possession of mind, if you remove the tau and insert omicron between the chi and the nu
 and the nu and the eta (making ἐχονόη )? Hermogenes. It does it very poorly, Socrates. Socrates. My friend, you do not bear in mind that the original words have before now been completely buried by those who wished to dress them up, for they have added and subtracted letters for the sake of euphony and have distorted the words in every way for ornamentation or merely in the lapse of time. Do you not, for instance, think it absurd that the letter rho is inserted in the word κάαπτρον (mirror)?
 I think that sort of thing is the work of people who care nothing for truth, but only for the shape of their mouths; so they keep adding to the original words until finally no human being can understand what in the world the word means. So the sphinx, for instance, is called sphinx, instead of phix, and there are many other examples. Hermogenes. Yes, that is true, Socrates. Socrates. And if we are permitted to insert and remove any letters we please in words, it will be perfectly easy to fit any name to anything.
 Hermogenes. True. Socrates. Yes, quite true. But I think you, as a wise director, must observe the rule of moderation and probability. Hermogenes. I should like to do so. Socrates. And I, too, Hermogenes.
 But do not, my friend, demand too much precision, lest you 
 enfeeble me of my sight. Hom. Il. 6.265 For now that τέχνη (art) is disposed of, I am nearing the loftiest height of my subject, when once we have investigated μηχανή (contrivance). For I think μηχανή signifies ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολύ (much accomplishment); for μῆκος (length) has about the same meaning as τὸ πολύ (much), and the name μηχανή is composed of these two, μῆκος and ἄνειν . But, as I was just saying, we must go on to the loftiest height of our subject; we must search for the meaning of the words ἀρετή (virtue) and κακία (wickedness). Now one of them I cannot yet see;
 but the other seems to be quite clear, since it agrees with everything we have said before. For inasmuch as all things are in motion, everything that moves badly ( κακῶς ἰόν ) would be evil ( κακία ); and when this evil motion in relation to its environment exists in the soul, it receives the general name κακία (evil) in the special sense of wickedness. But the nature of evil motion ( κακῶς ἰέναι ) is made clear, I think, also in the word δειλία (cowardice), which we have not yet discussed. We passed it by,
 when we ought to have examined it after ἀνδρεία (courage); and I fancy we passed over a good many other words. Now the meaning of δειλία is a strong bond of the soul ; for λίαν (excessively) is, in a way, expressive of strength; so δειλία would be the excessive or greatest bond ( δεσμός, δεῖν ) of the soul; and so, too, ἀπορία (perplexity) is an evil, as is everything, apparently, which hinders motion and progress ( πορεύεσθαι ). This, then, seems to be the meaning of evil motion ( κακῶς ἰέναι ), that advance is halting and impeded; and the soul that is infected by it becomes filled with wickedness ( κακία ). If these are the reasons for the name of wickedness, virtue ( ἀρετή ) would be the opposite of this; it would signify first ease of motion,
 and secondly that the flow of the good soul is always unimpeded, and therefore it has received this name, which designates that which always flows ( ἀεὶ ῥέον ) without let or hindrance. It is properly called ἀειρειτή , or perhaps also αἱρετή , indicating that this condition is especially to be chosen; but it has been compressed and is pronounced ἀρετή . Perhaps you will say this is another invention of mine; but I say if what I said just now about κακία is right,
 this about the name of ἀρετή is right too.
 Hermogenes. But what is the meaning of the word κακόν which you used in many of your derivations? Socrates. By Zeus, I think it is a strange word and hard to understand; so I apply to it that contrivance of mine. Hermogenes. What contrivance? Socrates. The claim of foreign origin, which I advance in this case as in those others. Hermogenes. Well, probably you are right. But, if you please, let us drop these words and try to discover the reasons for the words καλόν (beautiful, noble) and αἰσχρόν (base). Socrates. I think the meaning of αἰσχρόν is clear,
 and this also agrees with what has been said before. For the giver of names appears to me throughout to denounce that which hinders and restrains things from flowing, and in this instance he gave to that which always restrains the flow ( ἀεὶ ἴσχει τὸν ῥοῦν ) this name ἀεισχοροῦν , which is now compressed and pronounced αἰσχρόν . Hermogenes. What about καλόν ? Socrates. That is harder to understand, and yet it expresses its meaning: it has been altered merely in accent and in the length of the O.
 Hermogenes. How is that? Socrates. I think this word denotes intellect. Hermogenes. What do you mean? Socrates. Why, what do you think is the cause why anything is called by a name? Is it not the power which gave the name? Hermogenes. Why, certainly. Socrates. And is not that power the intellect either of gods or of men or both? Hermogenes. Yes. Socrates. Are not that which called things by name and that which calls them by name ( τὸ καλοῦν ) the same thing, namely intellect? Hermogenes. Yes, clearly. Socrates. And are not all works which are done by mind and intelligence worthy of praise, and those that are not done by them worthy of blame? Hermogenes. Certainly.
 Socrates. Does not the medical power perform medical works and the power of carpentry works of carpentry? Do you agree to that? Hermogenes. I agree. Socrates. And the beautiful performs beautiful works? Hermogenes. It must do so. Socrates. And the beautiful is, we say, intellect? Hermogenes. Certainly. Socrates. Then this name, the beautiful, is rightly given to mind, since it accomplishes the works which we call beautiful and in which we delight. Hermogenes. Evidently.
 Socrates. What further words of this sort are left for us? Hermogenes. Those that are related to the good and the beautiful,
 such as συμφέροντα (advantageous), λυσιτελοῦντα (profitable), ὠφέλιμα (useful), κερδαλέα (gainful), and their opposites. Socrates. You might by this time be able to find the meaning of συμφέροντα by yourself in the light of the previous explanations, for it appears to be own brother to ἐπιστήμη . It means nothing else but the motion ( φορά ) of the soul in company with the world, and naturally things which are done by such a power are called συμφέροντα and σύμφορα because they are carried round with ( συμπεριφέρεσθαι ) the world. But κερδαλέον is from κέρδος (gain).
 If you restore nu in the word κέρδος in place of the delta, the meaning is plain; it signifies good, but in another way. Because it passes through and is mingled ( κεράννυται ) with all things, he who named it gave it this name which indicates that function; but he inserted a delta instead of nu and said κέρδος . Hermogenes. And what is λυσιτελοῦν ? Socrates. I do not think, Hermogenes, the name-giver gives the meaning to λυσιτελοῦν which it has in the language of tradesfolk, when profit sets free ( ἀπολύει ) the sum invested,
 but he means that because it is the swiftest thing in the world it does not allow things to remain at rest and does not allow the motion to come to any end ( τέλος ) of movement or to stop or pause, but always, if any end of the motion is attempted, it sets it free, making it unceasing and immortal. It is in this sense, I think, that the good is dubbed λυσιτελοῦν , for it frees ( λύει ) the end ( τέλος ) of the motion. But the word ὠφέλιμον is a foreign one, which Homer often uses in the verbal form ὀφέλλειν . This is a synonym of increase and create. 
 Hermogenes. What shall be our explanations of the opposites of these? Socrates. Those of them that are mere negatives, need, I think, no discussion. Hermogenes. Which are those? Socrates. Disadvantageous, useless, unprofitable, and ungainful. Hermogenes. True. Socrates. But βλαβερόν (harmful) and ζημιῶδες (hurtful) do need it. Hermogenes. Yes. Socrates. And βλαβερόν means that which harms ( βλάπτον ) the flow ( ῥοῦν );
 but βλάπτον means wishing to fasten ( ἅπτειν ), and ἅπτειν is the same thing as δεῖν (bind), which the name-giver constantly finds fault with. Now τὸ βουλόμενον ἅπτειν ῥοῦν (that which wishes to fasten the flow) would most correctly be called βουλαπτεροῦν , but is called βλαβερόν merely, as I think, to make it prettier. Hermogenes. Elaborate names these are, Socrates, that result from your method. Just now,
 when you pronounced βουλαπτεροῦν , you looked as if you had made up your mouth to whistle the flute-prelude of the hymn to Athena.