Well then, this name Hermes seems to me to have to do with speech; he is an interpreter (ἡρμηνεύς) and a messenger, is wily and deceptive in speech, and is oratorical. All this activity is concerned with the power of speech. Now, as I said before, εἴρειν denotes the use of speech; moreover, Homer often uses the word ἐμήσατο, which means contrive. From these two words, then, the lawgiver imposes upon us the name of this god who contrived speech and the use of speech—εἴρεινmeans speak— and tells us: Ye human beings, he who contrived speech (εἴρειν ἐμήσατο) ought to be called Eiremes by you. We, however, have beautified the name, as we imagine, and call him Hermes. Iris also seems to have got her name from εἴρειν, because she is a messenger.

By Zeus, I believe Cratylus was right in saying I was not Hermogenes; I certainly am no good contriver of speech.

And it is reasonable, my friend, that Pan is the double-natured son of Hermes.

How is that?

You know that speech makes all things (πᾶν) known and always makes them circulate and move about, and is twofold, true and false.

Certainly.

Well, the true part is smooth and divine and dwells aloft among the gods, but falsehood dwells below among common men, is rough and like the tragic goatThe chorus of the primitive performances from which tragedy developed appeared as satyrs, clad in goat-skins. Hence the name τραγῳδία (goat-song). The adjective τραγικός may mean either goat-like or tragic. In this passage it has both meanings.; for tales and falsehoods are most at home there, in the tragic life.

Certainly.

Then Pan, who declares and always moves (ἀεὶ πολῶν) all, is rightly called goat-herd (αἰπόλος), being the double-natured son of Hermes, smooth in his upper parts, rough and goat-like in his lower parts. And Pan, if he is the son of Hermes, is either speech or the brother of speech, and that brother resembles brother is not at all surprising. But, as I said, my friend, let us get away from the gods.

From such gods as those, if you like, Socrates; but why should you not tell of another kind of gods, such as sun, moon, stars, earth, ether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?

You are imposing a good many tasks upon me; however, if it will give you pleasure, I am willing.

It will give me pleasure.

What, then, do you wish first? Shall we discuss the sun (Ἥλιος), as you mentioned it first?

By all means.

I think it would be clearer if we were to use the Doric form of the name. The Dorians call it Ἅλιος. Now ἅλιος might be derived from collecting (ἁλίζειν) men when he rises, or because he always turns (ἀεὶ εἱλεῖν) about the earth in his course, or because he variegates the products of the earth, for variegate is identical with αἰολλεῖν.

And what of the moon, Selene?

That name appears to put Anaxagoras in an uncomfortable position.

How so?

Why, it seems to have anticipated by many years the recent doctrine of Anaxagoras, that the moon receives its light from the sun.

How is that?

Σέλας (gleam) and φῶς (light) are the same thing.

Yes.

Now the light is always new and old about the moon, if the Anaxagoreans are right; for they say the sun, in its continuous course about the moon, always sheds new light upon it, and the light of the previous month persists.

Certainly.

The moon is often called Σελαναία.

Certainly.

Because it has always a new and old gleam (σέλα νέον τε καὶ ἕνον) the very most fitting name for it would be Σελαενονεοάεια, which has been compressed into Σελαναία.

That is a regular opera bouffe name, Socrates. But what have you to say of the month (μήν) and the stars?

The word month (μείς) would be properly pronounced μείης, from μειοῦσθαι, to grow less, and I think the stars (ἄστερα) get their name from ἀστραπή (lightning). But ἀστραπή, because it turns our eyes upwards (τὰ ὦπα ἀναστρέθει), would be called ἀναστρωπή, which is now pronounced more prettily ἀστραπή.

And what of πῦρ (fire) and ὕδωρ (water)?

Πῦρ is too much for me. It must be that either the muse of Euthyphro has deserted me or this is a very difficult word. Now just note the contrivance I introduce in all cases like this which are too much for me.

What contrivance?

I will tell you. Answer me; can you tell the reason of the word πῦρ?

Not I, by Zeus.

See what I suspect about it. I know that many Greeks, especially those who are subject to the barbarians, have adopted many foreign words.

What of that?

If we should try to demonstrate the fitness of those words in accordance with the Greek language, and not in accordance with the language from which they are derived, you know we should get into trouble.

Naturally.

Well, this word πῦρ is probably foreign; for it is difficult to connect it with the Greek language, and besides, the Phrygians have the same word, only slightly altered. The same is the case with ὕδωρ (water), κύων (dog), and many other words.

Yes, that is true.

So we must not propose forced explanations of these words, though something might be said about them. I therefore set aside πῦρ and ὕδωρ in this way. But is air called ἀήρ because it raises (αἴρει) things from the earth, or because it is always flowing (ἀεὶ ῥεῖ), or because wind arises from its flow? The poets call the winds ἀήτας, blasts. Perhaps the poet means to say air-flow (ἀητόρρουν), as he might say wind-flow (πνευματόρρουν). The word αἴθηρ (ether) I understand in this way: because it always runs and flows about the air (ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέον), it may properly be called ἀειθεήρα. The word γῆ (earth) shows the meaning better in the form γαῖα; for γαῖα is a correct word for mother, as Homer says, for he uses γεγάασιν to mean γεγενῆσθαι (be born). Well, now what came next?

The seasons, Socrates, and the two words for year.

The word ὧραι (seasons) should be pronounced in the old Attic fashion, ὅραι, if you wish to know the probable meaning; ΗΟΡΑΙ exist to divide winters and summers and winds and the fruits of the earth; and since they divide (ὁρίζουσι), they would rightly be called ὅραι. The two words for year, ἐνιαυτός and ἔτος, are really one. For that which brings to light within itself the plants and animals, each in its turn, and examines them, is called by some ἐνιαυτός, because of its activity within itself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ), and by others ἔτος, because it examines (ἐτάζει), just as we saw before that the name of Zeus was divided and some said Δία and others Ζῆνα. The whole phrase is that which examines within itself (τὸ ἐν ἁυτῷ ἐτάζον), and this one phrase is divided in speech so that the two words ἐνιαυτός and ἔτος are formed from one phrase.

Truly, Socrates, you are going ahead at a great rate.

Yes, I fancy I am already far along on the road of wisdom.

I am sure you are.

You will be surer presently.

Now after the class of words you, have explained, I should like to examine the correctness of the noble words that relate to virtue, such as wisdom, intelligence, justice, and all the others of that sort.

You are stirring up a mighty tribe of words, my friend; however, since I have put on the lion helmet, I must not play the coward, but must, it seems, examine wisdom, intelligence, thought, knowledge, and all the other noble words of which you speak.

Certainly we must not stop until that is done.

By dog, I believe I have a fine intuition which has just come to me, that the very ancient men who invented names were quite like most of the present philosophers who always get dizzy as they turn round and round in their search for the nature of things, and then the things seem to them to turn round and round and be in motion. They think the cause of this belief is not an affection within themselves, but that the nature of things really is such that nothing is at rest or stable, but everything is flowing and moving and always full of constant motion and generation. I say this because I thought of it with reference to all these words we are now considering.

How is that, Socrates?

Perhaps you did not observe that the names we just mentioned are given under the assumption that the things named are moving and flowing and being generated.

No, I did not notice that at all.

Surely the first one we mentioned is subject to such assumptions.

What is the word ?

Wisdom (φρόνησις); for it is perception (νόησις) of motion (φορᾶς) and flowing (ῥοῦ); or it might be understood as benefit (ὄνησις) of motion (φορᾶς); in either case it has to do with motion. And γνώμη (thought), if you please, certainly denotes contemplation and consideration of generation (γονῆς νώμησις); for to consider is the same as to contemplate. Or, if you please, νόησις (intelligence) is merely ἕσις (desire) τοῦ νεοῦ (of the new); but that things are new shows that they are always being generated; therefore the soul’s desire for generation is declared by the giver of the name νεόεσις; for in antiquity the name was not νόησις, but two epsilons had to be spoken instead of the eta.

Σωφροσύνη (self-restraint) is σωτηρία (salvation) of φρόνησις (wisdom), which we have just been discussing. And ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) indicates that the soul which is of any account accompanies (ἕπεται) things in their motion, neither falling behind them nor running in front of them; therefore we ought to insert an epsilon and call it ἐπεϊστήμη. Σύνεσις (intelligence) in its turn is a kind of reckoning together; when one says συνιέναι (understand), the same thing as ἐπίστασθαι is said; for συνιέναι means that the soul goes with things. Certainly σοφία (wisdom) denotes the touching of motion. This word is very obscure and of foreign origin; but we must remember that the poets often say of something which begins to advance ἐσύθη (it rushed). There was a famous Laconian whose name was Σοῦς (Rush), for this is the Laconian word for rapid motion. Now σοφία signifies the touching (ἐπαφή) of this rapid motion, the assumption being that things are in motion. And the word ἀγαθόν (good) is intended to denote the admirable (ἀγαστόν) in all nature. For since all things are in motion, they possess quickness and slowness; now not all that is swift, but only part of it, is admirable; this name ἀγαθόν is therefore given to the admirable (ἀγαστόν) part of the swift (θοοῦ).It is easy to conjecture that the word δικαιασύνη applies to the understanding (σύνεσις) of the just (τοῦ διαίον) but the word δίκαιον (just) is itself difficult. Up to a certain point, you see, many men seem to agree about it, but beyond that they differ. For those who think the universe is in motion believe that the greater part of it is of such a nature as to be a mere receptacle, and that there is some element which passes through all this, by means of which all created things are generated. And this element must be very rapid and very subtle; for it could not pass through all the universe unless it were very subtle, so that nothing could keep it out, and it must be very swift, so that all other things are relatively at rest. Since, then, it superintends and passes through (διαϊόν) all other things, this is rightly called by the name δίκαιον, the sound of the kappa being added merely for the sake of euphony.