Certainly.

On this basis, then, you will judge the law-giver, whether he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else, will you not?

Certainly.

Now who is likely to know whether the proper form of shuttle is embodied in any piece of wood? The carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it ?

Probably the one who is to use it, Socrates.

Then who is to use the work of the lyre-maker? Is not he the man who would know best how to superintend the making of the lyre and would also know whether it is well made or not when it is finished?

Certainly.

Who is he?

The lyre-player.

And who would know best about the work of the ship-builder?

The navigator.

And who can best superintend the work of the lawgiver and judge of it when it is finished, both here and in foreign countries? The user, is it not?

Yes.

And is not this he who knows how to ask questions?

Certainly.

And the same one knows also how to make replies?

Yes.

And the man who knows how to ask and answer questions you call a dialectician?

Yes, that is what I call him.

The work of the carpenter, then, is to make a rudder under the supervision of the steersman, if he rudder is to be a good one.

Evidently.

And the work of the lawgiver, as it seems, is to make a name, with the dialectician as his supervisor, if names are to be well given.

True.

Then, Hermogenes, the giving of names can hardly be, as you imagine, a trifling matter, or a task for trifling or casual persons: and Cratylus is right in saying that names belong to things by nature and that not every one is an artisan of names, but only he who keeps in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody its form in the letters and syllables.