Phaedo. And yet
 being ruled by pleasures 
 
 
 
 is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer
 pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what
 I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of
 self-indulgence. So it
 seems. My dear Simmias, I
 suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging
 pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for
 less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those
 things 
 
 
 must be exchanged and by means of and
 with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and
 courage and self-restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only
 with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added
 or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each
 other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish
 and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in fact a purification
 
 
 
 from all these things, and self-restraint
 and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I
 fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but
 in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes
 uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who
 arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say
 in the mysteries, the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few ;
 
 
 
 and these mystics are, I believe, those
 who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left
 nothing undone, and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But
 whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know
 clearly, when I have arrived there, very soon, if it is God’s will. This then,
 Simmias and Cebes, is the defence I offer to show that it is reasonable for me
 not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here,
 
 
 
 because I believe that there, no less
 than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in
 convincing you by my defence than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is
 well. Phaedo. When Socrates had finished, Cebes
 answered and said: Socrates, I agree to 
 
 
 
 the other things you say, but in regard
 to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves
 the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the day when the man dies it
 is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it,
 straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or
 smoke. If it exists anywhere by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which
 you have enumerated just now, 
 
 
 there would be
 good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But
 perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead
 the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence. What you say, Cebes, is true, said
 Socrates. Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about
 this to see whether it is probable or not? I do, said Cebes. I should like to hear what you think
 about it. Well, said
 Socrates, I do not believe anyone who heard us now, 
 
 
 even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering
 and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine
 the matter to the end. Let us consider it
 by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not.
 There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here
 and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the
 living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there, 
 
 
 would they not? For they could not be born again if
 they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it
 should really be made evident that the living are born only from the dead. But
 if this is not so then some other argument would be needed. 
 Certainly, said Cebes. Now, said he, if you wish to find this out
 easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to
 all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have
 birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all
 born or generated 
 
 
 only from their opposites,
 in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the
 disgraceful, the just of the unjust, and there are countless other similar
 pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything
 which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For
 instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and
 then have become greater. Yes.