Crito. I will try. Socrates. Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honorable to do wrong? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men,
 seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children? Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer? Do we believe this or not? Crito. We do. Socrates. Then we ought not to do wrong at all. Crito. Why, no. Socrates. And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.
 Crito. Apparently not. Socrates. Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not? Crito. Certainly not, Socrates. Socrates. Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right? Crito. Not right, certainly. Socrates. For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them. Crito. That is true. Socrates. Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us. 
 And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend ourselves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent
 to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point. Crito. I do hold to it and I agree with you; so go on. Socrates. Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this: ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements? Crito. He ought to do it. Socrates. Then consider whether, if we go away
 from here without the consent of the state, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not. Crito. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand. Socrates. Consider it in this way. If, as I was on the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us,
 the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private persons? What shall we say, Crito, in reply to this question and others of the same kind? For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator, about the destruction of that law which provides that the decisions reached by the courts shall be valid. Or shall we say to them,
 The state wronged me and did not judge the case rightly? Shall we say that, or what? Crito. That is what we shall say, by Zeus, Socrates. Socrates. What then if the laws should say, Socrates, is this the agreement you made with us, or did you agree to abide by the verdicts pronounced by the state? Now if I were surprised by what they said, perhaps they would continue, Don’t be surprised at what we say, Socrates, but answer, since you are in the habit of employing the method of question and answer. Come,
 what fault do you find with us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? In the first place, did we not bring you forth? Is it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Now tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us who are the laws of marriage? I find no fault, I should say. Or with those that have to do with the nurture of the child after he is born and with his education which you, like others, received? Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastics? 
 You did, I should say. Well then, when you were born and nurtured and educated, could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring and our slave, you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think right as between you and us rests on a basis of equality, so that whatever we undertake to do to you it is right for you to retaliate?