Socrates. For you, humanly speaking,
 are not involved in the necessity of dying tomorrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray. Now say, do you not think we were correct in saying that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but some and not others, and not those of all men, but only of some? What do you think? Is not this true? Crito. It is. Socrates. Then we ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones? Crito. Yes. Socrates. And the good ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish? Crito. Of course. Socrates. Come then, what used we to say about this? 
 If a man is an athlete and makes that his business, does he pay attention to every man’s praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer? Crito. To those of one man only. Socrates. Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude. Crito. Obviously. Socrates. And he must act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think. Crito. That is true.
 Socrates. Well then; if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards words of the many who have no special knowledge, will he not come to harm? Crito. Of course he will. Socrates. And what is this harm? In what direction and upon what part of the one who disobeys does it act? Crito. Evidently upon his body; for that is what it ruins. Socrates. Right. Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear
 the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others? And if we do not follow him, we shall injure and cripple that which we used to say is benefited by the right and is ruined by the wrong. Or is there nothing in this? Crito. I think it is true, Socrates. Socrates. Well then, if through yielding to the opinion of the ignorant we ruin that which is benefited by health and injured by disease,
 is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not? Crito. Yes. Socrates. Then is life worth living when the body is worthless and ruined? Crito. Certainly not. Socrates. But is it worth living when that is ruined which is injured by the wrong and improved by the right? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong,
 is less important than the body? Crito. By no means. Socrates. But more important? Crito. Much more. Socrates. Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. And so you introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of the multitude about the right and the noble and the good and their opposites. 
 But it might, of course, be said that the multitude can put us to death. Crito. That is clear, too. It would be said, Socrates. Socrates. That is true. But, my friend, the argument we have just finished seems to me still much the same as before; and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important. Crito. We do hold to it. Socrates. And that living well and living rightly are the same thing, do we hold to that, or not? Crito. We do. Socrates. Then we agree that the question is whether it is right for me to try to escape from here
 without the permission of the Athenians, or not right. And if it appears to be right, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up. But the considerations you suggest, about spending money, and reputation, and bringing up my children, these are really, Crito, the reflections of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again, if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude. But we, since our argument so constrains us, must consider only the question we just broached, whether we shall be doing right in giving money
 and thanks to these men who will help me to escape, and in escaping or aiding the escape ourselves, or shall in truth be doing wrong, if we do all these things. And if it appears that it is wrong for us to do them, it may be that we ought not to consider either whether we must die if we stay here and keep quiet or whether we must endure any thing else whatsoever, but only the question of doing wrong. Crito. I think what you say is right, Socrates; but think what we should do. Socrates. Let us, my good friend, investigate in common, and if you can contradict anything I say, do so, and I will yield to your arguments; 
 but if you cannot, my dear friend, stop at once saying the same thing to me over and over, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians; for I am anxious to act in this matter with your approval, and not contrary to your wishes. Now see if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply
 to my questions to the best of your belief.