I am not a seller of perfume The general sense of this mutilated passage is restored by Colin, in his translation, as follows: Despite his dishonest purpose, I accepted his word, and when he offered me the boy, raised no objection over the price. I thus agreed to pay 40 minas, but I now find I must produce five talents for a perfumery in which I have no interest. and I do not practise any other trade. I simply farm the property which my father gave me, and I was landed in the purchase by these people. Which is more probable, Athenogenes, that I set my heart on your trade in which I was not proficient, or that you and your mistress had designs on my money? Personally, I think that you are indicated. Therefore, gentlemen of the jury, you could fairly excuse me for being cheated by and for having had the misfortune to fall in with a man like this, but to Athenogenes all to be mine and the profits of the fraud to be his that I took Midas whom he says he was reluctant to let go. But for the boy whom, we are told, he originally offered me for nothing, he has now been paid a far higher price than he is worth; and yet in the end the boy will not be my property but will be freed on the strength of your verdict. The point of this remark is not clear. The plaintiff might mean that if he wins his case the boy will be freed, since he never intended to buy him as a slave; but the following sentence suggests that he has in mind at present the consequences of his condemnation. However I do not think myself that in addition to my other troubles I deserve to be disfranchised by Athenogenes. Disfranchisement could only follow upon condemnation if the plaintiff failed to obtain one-fifth of the votes and so became liable to pay ἐπωβελία ,i.e., compensation to Athenogenes at the rate of one-sixth of the sum in question. On failure to pay this he would become liable to prosecution again ( δίκη ἐξούλης ) and if condemned would have to pay a fine to the state too. Finally as a state debtor he would be liable to loss of civic rights ( ἀτιμία ). The payment of ἐπωβελία certainly obtained in mercantile, and some other cases, and probably in cases of damage also. See Andoc. 1.73 ; Dem. 21.44 , Dem. 27.67 , Dem. 28.21 , Dem. 47.64 ; Aeschin. 1.163 . For I should be receiving harsh treatment indeed, gentlemen of the jury, if of the metics to come unguarded. During the war against Philip he left the city just before the battle and did not serve with you at Chaeronea . Instead, he moved to Troezen , disregarding the law This law, which is not mentioned by any other writer appears to be the same as the one subsequently read out (§ 33) which forbade resident aliens to emigrate in time of war. It is not clear, however, why the clause quoted here should relate to an attempted return on the part of the lawbreaker rather than to his actual departure. If the plaintiff is making a valid point we must assume that the law existed before the battle of Chaeronea , since it was then that Athenogenes left Athens . If so, it must have applied to resident aliens only (as indeed appears from § 33 to have been the case) for had it applied to citizens, Lycurgus would surely have mentioned it in his speech against Leocrates, as he was there concerned with just this question. It is possible, however, that Hyperides is alluding to some provision which did not come into force until the time of emergency after Chaeronea , but is attempting to impose on the ignorance of his hearers. which says that a man who moves in wartime shall be indicted and summarily arrested if he returns. The reason for the move, it seems, was this: he thought that the city of Troezen would survive, whereas he had passed a sentence of death on ours. His daughters whom he had brought up in the prosperity which you provided he married off with the intention of returning later to carry on his business when peace was established.