That sheer necessity can force all men to belie their nature in both word and deed is a fact of which the defendant seems to me to be giving very real proof. Whereas in the past he was the last to show impudence or audacity, his very misfortune has today forced him to say things which I for one would never have expected of him. I, in my great folly, imagined that he would not reply; otherwise I would not have deprived myself of half of my opportunities as prosecutor by making only one speech instead of two; and he, but for his audacity, would not have had the twofold advantage over me of using one speech to answer the one speech for the prosecution and making his accusations when they could not be answered. I take the speaker to mean: The case seemed so simple that instead of developing any argument in my first speech for the prosecution, I merely stated the bare facts. The defendant, however, has made an elaborate reply, and will doubtless do the same again in his second speech; this is equivalent to his making two speeches to my one. Further, he will be able to use his second speech to answer my one serious speech for the prosecution ( ἕνα πρὸς ἕνα λόγον ἀπολογηθείς ); while I cannot effectively answer the attack which he made upon me in his first speech ( ἃ κατηγόρησεν ἀναποκρίτως εἰπών ), because, as prosecutor, I must now devote myself to attacking him.