It is not, as the prosecution maintain, unlikely that a man wandering about at the dead of night should be murdered for his clothing; nothing is more likely. The fact that he was not stripped indicates nothing. If the approach of passers-by startled his assailants into quitting him before they had had time to strip him, they showed sense, not madness, in preferring their lives to their spoils. Further, he may not in fact have been murdered for his clothing; he may have seen others engaged in some quite different outrage and have been killed by them to prevent his giving information of the crime; who knows? Again, were not those who hated him almost as much as I did—and there were a great many—more likely to have murdered him than I? It was plain to them that suspicion would fall on me; while I knew very well that I should bear the blame for them. Why, moreover, should the evidence of the attendant be allowed any weight? In his terror at the peril in which he stood, there was no likelihood of his recognizing the murderers. On the other hand, it was likely enough that he would obediently confirm any suggestions made by his masters. ἀναγιγνώσκειν in the sense of persuade, which it must bear here, is found elsewhere only in Herodotus. Masters implies that the passers-by who found the slave were members of the dead man’s own family, although this fact is nowhere explicitly mentioned by the prosecution. We distrust the evidence of slaves in general, or we should not torture them; so what justification have you for putting me to death on the evidence of this one? Further, whoever allows probability the force of fact when it testifies to my guilt must on the same principle bear the following in mind as evidence of my innocence; it was more likely that, with an eye to carrying out my plot in safety, I should take the precaution of not being present at the scene of the crime than that the slave should recognize me distinctly just as his throat was being cut. I will now show that, unless I was mad, I must have thought the danger in which I now stand far greater, instead of less, than the danger to be expected from the indictment. If I was convicted on the indictment, I knew that I should be stripped of my property; but I did not lose my life or civic rights. I should still have been alive, still left to enjoy those rights and even though I should have had to obtain a loan of money from my friends, ἔρανον συλλέγειν . Cf. infra 12, ἐρανίζειν . The reference in both cases is to a sum of money advanced without interest by friends who each contributed a portion. ἔρανος later came to have the more specialized sense of a club formed for the purpose of lending money without interest to any of its members. Each member paid a subscription (also called ἔρανος ); and such clubs often acquired landed property. They grew political in character as time went on. my fate would not have been the worst possible. On the other hand, if I am found guilty today and put to death, my children will inherit from me an insufferable disgrace; if instead I go into exile, I shall become a beggar in a strange land, an old man without a country.