See now, fellow citizens, how unlike to Timarchus were Solon and those men of old whom I mentioned a moment ago. They were too modest to speak with the arm outside the cloak, but this man not long ago, yes, only the other day, in an assembly of the people threw off his cloak and leaped about like a gymnast, half naked, his body so reduced and befouled through drunkenness and lewdness that right-minded men, at least, covered their eyes, being ashamed for the city, that we should let such men as he be our advisers. It was with such conduct as this in view that the lawgiver expressly prescribed who were to address the assembly, and who were not to be permitted to speak before the people. He does not exclude from the platform the man whose ancestors have not held a general’ s office, nor even the man who earns his daily bread by working at a trade; nay, these men he most heartily welcomes, and for this reason he repeats again and again the invitation, Who wishes to address the assembly? Who then are they who in the lawgiver’ s opinion are not to be permitted to speak? Those who have lived a shameful life; these men he forbids to address the people. Where does he show this? Under the heading Scrutiny of public men The Athenian ῥήτωρ was both public speaker and political leader. The profession was definite and well recognised. No one English word covers both the political and the oratorical activity of the profession. All public officials were required to submit to a fomal scrutiny ( δοκιμασία ) before taking office. The examining body was usually a law-court; in the case of the archons it was a court, after a preliminary hearing by the senate; senators elect appeared before the outgoing senate. From our passage it appears that a sort of scrutiny might be applied to the men who made politics their profession, without regard to any office for which they might be candidates. he says, If any one attempts to speak before the people who beats his father or mother, or fails to support them or to provide a home for them. Such a man, then, he forbids to speak. And right he is, by Zeus, say I! Why? Because if a man is mean toward those whom he ought to honor as the gods, how, pray, he asks, will such a man treat the members of another household, and how will he treat the whole city? Whom did he, in the second place, forbid to speak? Or the man who has failed to perform all the military service demanded of him, or who has thrown away his shield. And he is right. Why? Man, if you fail to take up arms in behalf of the state, or if you are such a coward that you are unable to defend her, you must not claim the right to advise her, either. Whom does he specify in the third place? Or the man, he says, who has debauched or prostituted himself. For the man who has made traffic of the shame of his own body, he thought would be ready to sell the common interests of the city also. But whom does he specify in the fourth place? Or the man, he says, who has squandered his patrimony or other inheritance. For he believed that the man who has mismanaged his own household will handle the affairs of the city in like manner; and to the lawgiver it did not seem possible that the same man could be a rascal in private life, and in public life a good and useful citizen; and he believed that the public man who comes to the platform ought to come prepared, not merely in words, but, before all else, in life.