<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0017.tlg003.perseus-eng2" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0017.tlg003.perseus-eng2" n="60"><p>Our opponents, then, have pushed their effrontery so far that, while they denied that the adopted son need obtain the adjudication of an estate which has been bequeathed to him, they thought fit to claim the adjudication of her father's estate to Phile, whom they allege to have been a legitimate daughter left by Pyrrhus. Yet, as I have already said, when testators leave legitimate issue, their children need not demand the adjudication of their patrimony; but, on the contrary, when testators adopt children by will, such children must obtain an adjudication of what is bequeathed to them. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0017.tlg003.perseus-eng2" n="61"><p>Since the former are the issue of the deceased, no one, I suppose, could dispute their possession of their patrimony; but all blood-relations think they have the right to dispute a bequest to an adopted son. In order, therefore, that suits for such estates may not be brought by any chance claimant and that persons may not dare to demand the adjudication of them as vacant inheritances, adopted sons apply to the court for an adjudication. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0017.tlg003.perseus-eng2" n="62"><p>Let none of you, therefore, imagine that, if Xenocles had believed his wife to be a legitimate child, he would have brought a suit claiming her patrimony; no, the legitimate daughter would have entered into possession of her father's estate, and, if anyone had tried to seize it or deprive her of it by violence, he would have been ousting her from her patrimony and would have been liable not only to a civil prosecution but also to a public denunciation to the archon and would have risked his person and all his possessions. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0017.tlg003.perseus-eng2" n="63"><p rend="align(indent)">Even before any action on the part of Xenocles, Pyrrhus's uncles, if they had known that their nephew had left a legitimate daughter and that none of us was willing to take her in marriage, would never have allowed Xenocles, who was an entire stranger in blood to Pyrrhus, to take and marry one who belonged to them by right of kinship. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0017.tlg003.perseus-eng2" n="64"><p>Such a proceeding would have been extraordinary. The law ordains that daughters who have been given in marriage by their father and are living with their husbands—and who can judge better than a father what is to his daughter's interest?—in spite of the fact that they are thus married, shall, if their father dies without leaving them legitimate brothers, pass into the legal power of their next-of-kin; and indeed it has frequently happened that husbands have been thus deprived of their own wives.<note resp="Loeb" anchored="true">Though the legal principle here stated is correct, it does not apply to all cases indiscriminately. For example, if a daughter, who was an heiress, married and had children, her rights accrued to the children when thy came of age; no doubt also, if she had no children, she could renounce her rights and remain with her husband.</note> </p></div></div></body></text></TEI>