For is it not an outrageous thing, men of tlie jury, that he should state—as he will presently in his speech—that he is an adopted son, while in his affidavit he did not dare to write this? Or that, while in the affidavit the protest is made as though for a son of the body, the speech that will presently be made will be on behalf of an adopted son? If they are going to make their defence conflict with the affidavit, surely either what they say, or what they swore, is false. It was with good reason that they did not add to the affidavit mention of the adoption, for in that case they would have had to add the words adopted by so-and-so. But Archiades never did adopt them; they adopted themselves, in order to rob us of the inheritance. Now is not their next proceeding absurd as well as outrageous?—that Leostratus here should have made his deposit for costs in the inheritance suit before the archon, as being the son of Archiades (while he was an Eleusinian, and Archiades of the deme Otrynê), but that someone else should have sworn the affidavit, as you see for yourselves, alleging that he, too, was a son of Archiades? To which of the two should you pay attention, as telling the truth? This very thing is the strongest proof of the falsehood of the affidavit—that it is not the same person who makes the claim about the same matter. And this is not strange for, I fancy, when Leostratus here made his deposit in the inheritance suit against us, the one who has now sworn the affidavit had not yet registered himself as a member of the deme. We should therefore be most cruelly treated if you should believe an affidavit made after the suit was begun.