Read the next one. And it shall not be lawful to propose a statute directed against an individual, unless the same apply to all Athenians. The statute just read is not, like the others, taken from the Laws of Homicide, but it is just as good—as good as ever law was. The man who introduced it was of opinion that, as every citizen has an equal share in civil rights, so everybody should have an equal share in the laws; and therefore he moved that it should not be lawful to propose a law affecting any individual, unless the same applied to all Athenians. Now seeing that it is agreed that the drafting of decrees must conform to the law, a man who draws a decree for the special benefit of Charidemus, such as is not applicable to all the rest of you, must evidently be making a proposal in defiance of this statute also; of course what it is unlawful to put into a statute cannot legitimately be put into a decree. Read the next statute,—or is that all of them? The Statute No decree either of the Council or of the Assembly shall have superior authority to a statute. Put it down.—I take it, gentlemen, that a very short and easy argument will serve me to prove that this statute has been violated in the drafting of the decree. When there are so many statutes, and when a man makes a motion that contravenes every one of them, and incorporates a private transaction in a decree, how can anyone deny that he is claiming for his decree authority superior to that of a statute? Now I wish to cite for your information one or two decrees drawn in favour of genuine benefactors of the commonwealth, to satisfy you that it is easy to frame such things without injustice, when they are drawn for the express purpose of doing honor to a man, and of admitting him to a share of our own privileges, and when, under the pretence of doing so, there is no malicious and fraudulent intention.—Read these decrees.—To save you a long hearing, the clauses corresponding to that for which I am prosecuting the defendant have been extracted from the several decrees. (The Clerk reads excerpts from sundry Decrees.) You see, men of Athens , that they have all drawn them in the same fashion. For instance: There shall be the same redress for him as if the person slain were an Athenian. Here, without tampering with your existing laws respecting such offences, they enhance the dignity of those laws by making it an act of grace to allow a share in them to others. Not so Aristocrates: he does his very best to drag the laws through the mire; anyhow, he tried to compose something of his own, as though they were worth nothing; and he makes light even of that act of grace which you bestowed your citizenship upon Charidemus. For when he assumes that you still owe the man a debt of gratitude, and has proposed that you should protect him into the bargain, so that he may do just what he likes with impunity, does not such conduct merit my description? I am well aware, men of Athens , that, although Aristocrates will be quite unable to disprove the charge of framing his decree in open defiance of the laws, he will make an attempt to shuffle away the most serious part of the accusation,—namely, that from beginning to end of his decree he does not order any trial of a very grave indictment. On that point I do not think I need say much; but I will prove clearly from the actual phrasing of the decree that he himself does not suppose that the man accused will get any trial at all.