Nor is it only these considerations that prove that such was the purpose for which the resolution was moved: the decree itself supplies evidence of great weight. After drafting the words if any person put Charidemus to death, and omitting any proviso of what Charidemus might be doing, whether for or against your advantage, the mover forthwith added, he shall be liable to seizure and removal from the territory of our allies. Now no man who is an enemy of ours as well as of Charidemus will ever enter allied territory, whether he has put him to death or not, and therefore it is not against such men that this retribution has been directed. The man who will be alarmed by this decree, and will be on his guard against be coming our certain enemy, is one who is a friend of ours, and also an enemy of his, if he should attempt anything inimical to us. And that man is Athenodorus, or Simon, or Bianor, kings of Thrace , or any other man who may wish to lay you under obligation by restraining Charidemus when he is trying to act in opposition to you. Such, men of Athens , are the purposes for which the provisional resolution was moved, in the hope that it would be ratified by a deluded Assembly; and such the reasons why we, desiring to frustrate its ratification, have brought this present indictment. As I have undertaken to prove three propositions,—first that the decree is unconstitutional, secondly that it is injurious to the common weal, and thirdly that the person in whose favour it has been moved is unworthy of such privilege,—it is, perhaps, fair that I should allow you, who are to hear me, to choose what you wish to hear first, and second, and last. Consider what you prefer, that I may begin with that.—You wish me to deal first with the illegality? Very well; I will do so. There is a favour which I not only ask but claim from you all,—with justice, as I am inclined to think. I beg that none of you, men of Athens , taking a partisan view, because you have been deceived in Charidemus and look on him as a benefactor, will give an unfriendly hearing to my remarks on the point of law. Do not, for that reason, rob yourselves of the power to cast an honest vote, and me of the right to present my whole case as I think fit. You must listen to me in the manner following,—and observe how fairly I will put it. When I am discussing the point of law, you must disregard the person, and the character of the person, in whose favour the decree has been proposed, and attend to the question whether it is legal or illegal,—that and that alone. When I am bringing the man’s deeds home to him, and relating in what fashion you have been overreached by him, you must look only at the transactions,—do I relate them accurately or untruly?