for the former put into our minds the expectation both of regaining our possessions in
 the several states and of recovering the power which we formerly enjoyed, As head of the Confederacy of Delos , which developed into the Athenian Empire. During the period of
 supremacy, which lasted from the close of the Persian Wars to the end of the
 Peloponnesian War, Athens frequently
 disciplined recalcitrant confederate states by expelling their citizens and settling
 Athenians on their lands. Such settlements were called cleruchies. When Athens formed the new naval confederacy in 378 B.C. it was expressly stipulated by her allies and agreed to
 by Athens that such abuse of power should
 not be repeated. But the jingoistic orators advocated nothing less than the restoration
 of the former empire with all its powers and practices. while the latter hold
 forth no such hope, insisting rather that we must have peace and not crave great
 possessions contrary to justice, The state which seizes and
 holds foreign possessions is a robber. Isocrates throughout this discourse proposes to
 make the moral code within the state the basis of her foreign policy. but be
 content with those we have A proverbial tag. Cf. Isoc. 1.29 . —and that for the great majority of mankind is
 of all things the most difficult. For we are so dependent on our hopes and so insatiate in seizing what seems to be our
 advantage that not even those who possess the greatest fortunes are willing to rest
 satisfied with them but are always grasping after more and so risking the loss of what
 they have. Wherefore we may well be anxious lest on the present occasion also we may be
 subject to this madness. For some of us appear to me to be over zealously bent on war, as though having heard, not
 from haphazard counsellors, but from the gods, that we are destined to succeed in all our
 campaigns and to prevail easily over our foes. But people of intelligence, when dealing
 with matters about which they have knowledge, ought not to take counsel—for this is
 superfluous—but to act as men who are already resolved what to do, whereas, in dealing
 with matters about which they take counsel, they ought not to think that they have exact
 knowledge of what the result will be, but to be minded towards these contingencies as men
 who indeed exercise their best judgement, but are not sure what the future may hold in
 store. This some what wordy passsage in which the orator
 becomes the philosopher reflects a fundamental idea of his pedagogy: There can be no
 exact science or knowledge of what to do in all contingencies and relations of life; the
 best that we can do is to develop sound, not infalliable, judgement in dealing with
 them. See General Introd. p. xxvii, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L., and Isoc. 15.184 , note. 
 You, however, do neither the one thing nor the other, but are in the utmost confusion of
 mind. For you have come together as if it were your business to select the best course
 from all that are proposed; nevertheless, as though you had clear knowledge of what must
 be done, you are not willing to listen to any except those who speak for your pleasure.
 And yet, if you really desired to find out what is advantageous to the state, you ought
 to give your attention more to those who oppose your views than to those who seek to
 gratify you, knowing well that of the orators who come before you here, those who say what
 you desire are able to delude you easily—since what is spoken to win favor clouds your
 vision of what is best—whereas those who advise you without regard to your pleasure can
 affect you in no such way,