INTRODUCTION If the present essay is the work of Plutarch, The only recent attempt, that of Hartman, to show that it is not, relies on the looseness of the reasoning, the tediousness of the argumentation, and the absence of anything that might be called structure. But all three of these are by no means unusual in admittedly genuine works. The language and phraseology appear to the present editor, at any rate, to be Plutarchean. we may, perhaps, be surprised at the diffuseness with which the author permits himself to wander at leisure over the preserves of Aristotelian psychology, while almost completely neglecting the promises made in such high-sounding terms in his first sentence. The purpose of the essay is apparently to refute certain tenets of Stoic psychology, and these are, to be sure, attacked with some spirit, but at such length and with so little attention to logic or to their intended meaning, that complete success is not to be expected. The point which is continually belaboured is that there are two parts of the soul, the Rational and the Irrational; for Moral Virtue to arise, the Rational must control the Irrational. So much our author has gleaned from Aristotle and to this he adds very little; nor can he apply his vast reading in poetry and philosophy with much effect to the demolition of Stoic dogma, which he appears in several points to have misunderstood. On the whole, whether from the standpoint of popular or from that of serious philosophy, this is one of the least successful of Plutarch’s works. But Hartman’s words are no doubt too harsh: Multo...Chaeronensi indignior hic libellus, quem, ut ad finem perlegas quantum tibi est taedii devorandum! A word on the terminology is necessary: Aristotelian usage is probably intended throughout the greater part of the w ork. I have, therefore, followed most English Aristotelians in my rendering of many terms, with δύναμις capacity or faculty or power, φρόνησις prudence, and the like. ἕξις I have rendered acquired state, but πάθος and its forms and derivatives I have translated emotions, passions, experiences, according to my interpretation of the context. See Mr. H. Rackham’s very just remarks in the preface to his recent (L.C.L., 1935) edition of the Atheniensium Respublica . It is interesting to notice that Pope in the Essay on Man (ii. 51 if.) has apparently drawn his philosophy from Plutarch’s diluted Aristotelianism rather than from the fountain head. Cf. T. Sinko ( Eos , xv. 1909, pp. 119-122), who further holds this essay to be the product of Plutarch’s youth, comparing the more mature attitude toward the passions to be found in De Cohibenda Ira and De Tranquillitate Animi . The ms. tradition is fairly good. The work has been well edited by Mr. Pohlenz in the Teubner series; from this edition most of the critical notes and the parallel passages have been taken. The work is No. 72 in Lamprias’s catalogue of Plutarch’s writings. It is my purpose to speak of that virtue which is called moral and reputed to be so, which differs from contemplative virtue chiefly in that it has as its material the emotions of the soul and as its form reason, and to inquire what its essential nature is and how, by its nature, it subsists; whether, also, that part of the soul which receives it is equipped with its own reason, or does but share in the reason of some other part; and if the latter, whether it does this after the manner of elements that are mingled with what is better than themselves, or rather, whether this portion of the soul is guided and governed by another part and in this sense may be said to share in that governing part’s power. For that it is possible for virtue also to have come into being and to remain entirely independent of matter and free from all admixture with it, I think is quite obvious. It is better, however, to run summarily through the opinions of the philosophers holding opposing views, not so much for the sake of inquiring into them as that my own opinions may become clearer and more firmly established when those of the philosophers in question have been presented. In the first place, Menedemus of Eretria deprived the virtues of both plurality and differences by asserting that virtue is but one, though it goes under many names: the same thing is meant by temperance and courage and justice, as is the case with mortal and man. And Ariston of Chios Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. , i. p. 86. himself also made virtue but one in its essential nature and called it health; but in its relative aspect he made certain distinctions and multiplied virtues, just as though one should wish to call our sight white-sight when it is applied to white objects, or black-sight when applied to black objects, or anything else of the sort. For instance virtue, when it considers what we must do or avoid, is called prudence Cf. for example, Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea , vi. 6. 1: prudence is concerned only with things which admit of variation. ; when it controls our desires and lays down for them the limitations of moderation and seasonableness in our pleasures, it is called temperance; when it has to do with men’s relations to one another and their commercial dealings, it is called justice - just as a knife is one and the same knife, though it cuts now one thing, now another, or as a fire retains its single nature though it operates upon different substances. Moreover it appears likely that Zeno Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. , i. p. 48; Cf. also Moralia , 97 e and 1034 c. of Citium also inclines in some measure to this opinion, for he defines prudence as justice when it is concerned with what must be rendered to others as their due, as temperance when concerned with what must be chosen or avoided, as fortitude when concerned with what must be endured; and those who defend Zeno postulate that in these definitions he uses the word prudence in the sense of knowledge. Chrysippus, Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. , iii. p. 59. however, by his opinion that corresponding to each several quality a virtue is formed by its own distinctive attribute of quality, unwittingly stirred up a swarm of virtues, as Plato Meno , 72 a; cf. Moralia , 93 b. has it, which were not familiar nor even known; for as from the adjective brave he derived bravery, from mild mildness, and justice from just, so from charming he derived charmingnesses, from virtuous virtuousnesses, from great greatnesses, from honourable honourablenesses, postulating also the other qualities of the same sort, dexterousnesses, approachablenesses, adroitnesses, as virtues, and thus filled philosophy, which needed nothing of the sort, with many uncouth names. Yet all of these men agree Cf. von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. , i. pp. 49, 50: iii. p. 111. in supposing virtue to be a certain disposition of the governing portion of the soul and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason. For the phrase Cf. Plato, Parmenides , 141 d: Marcus Aurelius, ii. 5. Passion, in fact, according to them, is a vicious and intemperate reason, formed from an evil and perverse judgement which has acquired additional violence and strength. But it seems to have eluded all these philosophers in what way each of us is truly two-fold and composite. cf. Moralia , 943 a and 1083 c. For that other two-fold nature of ours they have not discerned, but merely the more obvious one, the blend of soul and body. But that there is some element of composition, some two-fold nature and dissimilarity of the very soul within itself, since the irrational, as though it were another substance, is mingled and joined with reason by some compulsion of Nature-this, it is likely, was not unknown even to Pythagoras, if we may judge by the mans enthusiasm for the study of music, which he introduced to enchant and assuage the soul, Cf. Plato, Euthydemus , 290 a. perceiving that the soul has not every part of itself in subjection to discipline and study, and that not every part can be changed from vice by reason, but that the several parts have need of some other kind of persuasion to co-operate with them, to mould them, and to tame them, if they are not to be utterly intractable and obstinate to the teaching of philosophy. Plato, Timaeus , 35 a ff.; Cf. also the treatise De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo ( Moralia , 1012 b ff.). however, comprehended clearly, firmly, and without reservation both that the soul of this universe of ours is not simple nor uncompounded nor uniform, but that, being compounded of the potentialities of sameness and otherness, in one part it is ever governed in uniformity and revolves in but one and the same order, which maintains control, yet in another part it is split into movements and circles which go in contrariety to each other and wander about, thus giving rise to the beginnings of differentiation and change and dissimilarity in those things which come into being and pass away on earth; and also that the soul of man, Cf. Timaeus , 69 c ff. since it is a portion or a copy of the soul of the Universe and is joined together on principles and in proportions corresponding to those which govern the Universe, Cf. Themistius, Paraphrasis Aristotelis de Anima , i. 5 (p. 59 ed. Spengel). is not simple nor subj ect to similar emotions, but has as one part the intelligent and rational, whose natural duty it is to govern and rule the individual, and as another part the passionate and irrational, the variable and disorderly, which has need of a director. This second part is again subdivided into two parts, one of which, by nature ever willing to consort with the body and to serve the body, is called the appetitive; the other, which sometimes joins forces with this part and sometimes lends strength and vigour to reason, is called the spirited part. And Plato Republic , 435 a ff. shows this differentiation chiefly by the opposition of the reasoning and intelligent part to the appetitive part and the spirited part, since it is by the very fact that these last are different that they are frequently disobedient and quarrel with the better part. Aristotle Cf. 448 a, infra , and the note. at first made use of these principles to a very great extent, as is obvious from his writings. But later Cf. De Anima , iii. 9 (432 a 25); Magna Moralia , i. 1 (1182 a 24); Ethica Eudemia , ii. 1. 15 (1219 b 28); Ethica Nicomachea , i. 13. 9 (1102 a 29); Iamblichus, Protrepticus , 7 (p. 41 ed. Pistelli). he assigned the spirited to the appetitive part, on the ground that anger is a sort of appetite and desire to cause pain in requital Cf. Aristotle, De Anima , i. 1 (403 a 30); Seneca, De Ira , i. 3. 3. ; to the end, however, he continued to treat the passionate and irrational part as distinct from the rational, not because this part is wholly irrational, as is the perceptive part of the soul, or the nutritive and vegetative part (for these parts are completely unsubmissive and deaf to reason and, so to speak, mere off-shoots of our flesh and wholly attached to the body), but though the passionate part is wanting in reason and has no reason of its own, yet otherwise it is by nature fitted to heed the rational and intelligent part, to turn toward it, to yield to it, to conform itself thereto, if it is not completely corrupted by foolish pleasure and a life of no restraint. Those who wonder how it is that this part is irrational, yet subservient to reason, do not seem to me to reflect thoroughly upon the power of reason, How great it is, how far it penetrates, Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2 , p. 648, Euripides, Frag. 898. through its mastery and guidance, not by harsh and inflexible methods, but by flexible ones, which have a quality of yielding and submitting to the rein which is more effective than any possible constraint or violence. For, to be sure, even our breathing, our sinews and bones, and the other parts of the body, though they are irrational, yet when an impulse comes, with reason shaking the reins, as it were, they all grow taut and are drawn together in ready obedience. So, when a man purposes to run, his feet are keyed for action; if he purposes to throw or to grasp, his hands fall to their business. And most excellently does the Poet Homer, Od. , xix. 208-212; cf. Moralia , 475 a, 506 a=b, and De Vita et Poesi Homeri , 135 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 409). portray in the following words the sympathy and conformity of the irrational with reason: Thus were her fair cheeks wet with tears, as she Wept for her lord, though he sat by. In heart Odysseus pitied his lamenting wife, But kept his eyes firm-fixed within their lids Like horn or iron: with guile he hid his tears. Under such subjection to his judgement did he keep his breathing and his blood and his tears. An evident proof of this is also the shrinking and withdrawal of the private parts, which hold their peace and remain quiet in the presence of such beautiful maidens and youths as neither reason nor law allows us to touch. This is particularly the case with those who first fall in love and then hear that they have unwittingly become enamoured of a sister or a daughter; for lust cowers as reason asserts itself and, at the same time, the body brings its parts into decent conformity with the judgement. Indeed, very often with foods and meat, when men have partaken of them with gusto, if they then perceive or come to know that they have eaten something unclean or unlawful, not only is this judgement of theirs attended by displeasure and remorse, but the body itself, revolted and sharing the mind’s disgust, falls a prey to the retchings and vomitings of nausea. But I fear that I shall be thought to be rounding out my discourse with instances which are altogether seductive and exotic, if I recount in full how harps and lyres, pipes and flutes, and all the other harmonious and consonant instruments which musical art has devised, void of soul though they be, accord in songs of both joy and grief, in stately measures and dissolute tunes, with human experiences, reproducing the judgements, the experiences, and the morals of those who use them. And yet they say that even Zeno Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. , i. p. 67; Cf. also Moralia , 1029 e. on his way to the theatre when Amoebeus Cf. Life of Aratus , xvii. (1034 e); Athenaeus, xiv. 623 d; Aelian, Varia Historia , iii. 30. was singing to the lyre, remarked to his pupils, Come, let us observe what harmony and music gut and sinew, wood and bone, send forth when they partake of reason, proportion, and order. But, letting these subjects pass, I would gladly learn from my opponents whether, when they see dogs, horses, and domestic birds, through habituation, breeding, and teaching, uttering intelligible sounds and moving and assuming postures in subordination to reason, and acting in a manner conformable to due proportion and our advantage; and when they hear Homer declaring that Achilles Urged on both horses and men Adapted from Il. , xvi. 167. to battle - whether, I say, they still wonder and are in doubt that the element in us which is spirited and appetitive and experiences pain and pleasure, does, by its very nature, harken to the intelligence, and is affected and harmoniously disposed by its agency, and does not dwell apart from the intelligence, nor is it separated therefrom, nor moulded from without the body, nor formed by any extraneous violence or blows, but that by its nature it is dependent upon the intelligence and is always in association with it and nurtured together with it and influenced by familiar intercourse. Therefore, also, ethical, or moral, virtue ( ethos ) is well named, cf. Moralia , 3 a, 551 e; Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea , ii. 1. 1 (1103 a 17). for ethical virtue is, to but sketch the subject, a quality of the irrational, and it is so named because the irrational, being formed by reason, acquires this quality and differentiation by habit ( ethos ), since reason does not wish to eradicate passion completely (for that would be neither possible Cf. 452 b, infra . nor expedient), but puts upon it some limitation and order and implants the ethical virtues, which are not the absence of passion but a due proportion and measure therein; and reason implants them by using prudence to develop the capacity for passion into a good acquired disposition. For these three things the soul is said to possess Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea , ii. 5 (1105 b 19); Stobaeus, Eclogae , ii. 7. 20 (vol. ii. p. 139 ed. Wachsmuth). : capacity, passion, acquired state. Now capacity The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable of feeling anger or fear [mss. read pain] or pity. (Aristotle, l.c. , Rackham’s translation adapted.) is the starting-point, or raw material, of passion, as, for instance, irascibility, bashfulness, temerity. And passion is a kind of stirring or movement of the capacity, as anger, shame, boldness. And finally, the acquired state is a settled force and condition of the capacity of the irrational, this settled condition being bred by habit and becoming on the one hand vice, if the passion has been educated badly, but virtue, if educated excellently by reason.