Crantor Mullach, Frag. Philor. Graec. iii. p. 149. says that not being to blame for one’s unhappy state is no small alleviation for misfortunes; but I should say that it surpasses all others as a remedy for the cure of grief. But affection and love for the departed does not consist in distressing ourselves, but in benefiting the beloved one; and a benefit for those who have been taken away is the honour paid to them through keeping their memory green. For no good man, after he is dead, is deserving of lamentations, but of hymns and songs of joy; not of mourning, but of an honourable memory; not of sorrowing tears, but of offerings of sacrifice,—if the departed one is now a partaker in some life more divine, relieved of servitude to the body, and of these everlasting cares and misfortunes which those who have received a mortal life as their portion are constrained to undergo until such time as they shall complete their allotted earthly existence, which Nature has not given to us for eternity; but she has distributed to us severally the apportioned amount in accordance with the laws of fate. Wherefore, over those who die men of good sense ought not to be carried away by sorrow beyond the natural and moderate limit of grief, which so affects the soul, into useless and barbarian mourning, and they ought not to wait for that outcome which has already been the lot of many in the past, the result of which is that they terminate their own lives in misery before they have put off their mourning, and gain nothing but a forlorn burial in their garments of sorrow, as their woes and the ills born of their unreasonableness follow them to the grave, so that one might utter over them the verse of Homer: Combined from Il. xxiii. 109, and Od. i. 423 (= Od. xviii. 306). While they were weeping and wailing black darkness descended upon them. We should therefore often hold converse with ourselves after this fashion and say: What ? Shall we some day cease grieving, or shall we consort with unceasing misery to the very end of our life ? For to regard our mourning as unending is the mark of the most extreme foolishness, especially when we observe how those who have been in the deepest grief and greatest mourning often become most cheerful under the influence of time, and at the very tombs where they gave violent expression to their grief by wailing and beating their breasts, they arrange most elaborate banquets with musicians and all the other forms of diversion. It is accordingly the mark of a madman thus to assume that he shall keep his mourning permanently. If, however, men should reason that mourning will come to an end after some particular event, they might go on and reason that it will come to an end when time, forsooth, has produced some effect; for not even God can undo what has been done. So, then, that which in the present instance has come to pass contrary to our expectation and contrary to our opinion has only demonstrated what is wont, through the very course of events, to happen in the case of many men. What then ? Are we unable, through reason, to learn this fact and draw the conclusion, that Full is the earth now of evils, and full of them too is the ocean, Hesiod, Works and Days , 101; cf. 105 E supra. and also this: Such woes of woes for mortal men, And round about the Fates throng close; There is no vacant pathway for the air ? From an unknown lyric poet; Cf. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. iii. p. 689. Not merely now, but long ago, as Crantor Mullach, Frag. Philos. Graec. iii. p. 149. says, the lot of man has been bewailed by many wise men, who have felt that life is a punishment and that for man to be born at all is the greatest calamity. Aristotle Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations , i. 48 (114), and Aristotle, Frag. No. 44 Rose. says that Silenus when he was captured declared this to Midas. It is better to quote the very words of the philosopher. He says, in the work which is entitled Eudemus, or Of the Soul, the following: Wherefore, O best and blessedest of all, in addition to believing that those who have ended this life are blessed and happy, we also think that to say anything false or slanderous against them is impious, from our feeling that it is directed against those who have already become our betters and superiors. And this is such an old and ancient belief with us that no one knows at all either the beginning of the time or the name of the person who first promulgated it, but it continues to be a fixed belief for all time. Cf. Sophocles, Antigone 466. And in addition to this you observe how the saying, which is on the lips of all men, has been passed from mouth to mouth for many years. What is this ? said he. And the other, again taking up the discourse, said: That not to be born is the best of all, and that to be dead is better than to live. And the proof that this is so has been given to many men by the deity. So, for example, they say that Silenus, after the hunt in which Midas of yore had captured him, when Midas questioned and inquired of him what is the best thing for mankind and what is the most preferable of all things, was at first unwilling to tell, but maintained a stubborn silence. But when at last, by employing every device, Midas induced him to say something to him, Silenus, forced to speak, said: Ephemeral offspring of a travailing genius and of harsh fortune, why do you force me to speak what it were better for you men not to know ? For a life spent in ignorance of one’s own woes is most free from grief. But for men it is utterly impossible that they should obtain the best thing of all, or even have any share in its nature (for the best thing for all men and women is not to be born); however, the next best thing to this, and the first of those to which man can attain, but nevertheless only the second best, is, after being born, to die as quickly as possible. Cf. Theognis, 425; Bacchylidies, v. 160; Sophocles, Oed. Col. 1225; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations , i. 48 (115). It is evident, therefore, that he made this declaration with the conviction that the existence after death is better than that in life. One might cite thousands and thousands of examples under this same head, but there is no need to be prolix. We ought not, therefore, to lament those who die young on the ground that they have been deprived of those things which in a long life are accounted good; for this is uncertain, as we have often said—whether the things of which they have been deprived are good or evil; for the evils are much the more numerous. And whereas we acquire the good things only with difficulty and at the expense of many anxieties, the evils we acquire very easily. For they say that the latter are compact and conjoined, and are brought together by many influences, while the good things are disjoined, and hardly manage to unite towards the very end of life. We therefore resemble men who have forgotten, not merely, as Euripides Adapted from the Phoenissae , 555. says, that Mortals are not the owners of their wealth, but also that they do not own a single one of human possessions. Wherefore we must say in regard to all things that We keep and care for that which is the gods’, And when they will they take it back again. Ibid. 556. We ought not, therefore, to bear it with bad grace if the gods make demand upon us for what they have loaned us for a short time. Cf. Cebes, Tabula , xxxi., and Cicero, Tusculan Disputations , i. 39 (93). For even the bankers, as we are in the habit of saying frequently, when demand is made upon them for the return of deposits, do not chafe at the repayment, if they be honourable men. To those who do not make repayment with good grace one might fairly say, Have you forgotten that you accepted this on condition that you should return it ? Quite parallel is the lot of all mortals. For we hold our life, as it were, on deposit from the gods, who have compelled us to accept the account, and there is no fixed time for its return, just as with the bankers and their deposits, but it is uncertain when the depositor will demand payment. If a man, therefore, is exceedingly indignant, either when he himself is about to die, or when his children have died, must he not manifestly have forgotten that he is but human and the father of children who are mortal ? For it is not characteristic of a man of sense to be unaware of the fact that man is a mortal creature, and that he is born to die. At any rate, if Niobe of the fable had had this conception ready at hand, that even the woman who, Laden with the happy burden Of sweet life and growing children, Looks upon the pleasant sunlight, From an unknown poet; Cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. , Adespota, No. 373, and Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. iii. p. 720. must die, she would not have been so resentful as to wish to abandon life on account of the magnitude of her misfortune, and to implore the gods that she herself might be hurried to the most awful perdition. There are two of the inscriptions at Delphi Cf. Plato, Protagoras , p. 343 B, and Charmides , p. 165 A; Aristotle, Rheoric , ii. 12, 14; Pausanias, x. 24, 1; Plutarch, Moralia , 167 B, 385 D, and 511 B, and De vita et poesi Homeri , 151. which are most indispensable to living. These are: Know thyself and Avoid extremes, for on these two commandments hang all the rest. These two are in harmony and agreement with each other, and the one seems to be made as clear as possible through the other. For in self-knowledge is included the avoidance of extremes, and in the latter is included self-knowledge. Therefore Ion Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 743, Ion, No. 55. speaks of the former as follows: Not much to say is Know thyself ; to do This, Zeus alone of gods doth understand. And, of the other, Pindar Frag. 216 (Christ). says: The wise have landed with exceeding praise the words Avoid extremes. If, then, one keeps these in mind as god-given injunctions, he will be able easily to adapt them to all the circumstances of life, and to bear with such circumstances intelligently, by being heedful of his own nature, and heedful, in whatever may befall him, not to go beyond the limit of propriety, either in being elated to boastfulness or in being humbled and cast down to wailings and lamentations, through weakness of the spirit and the fear of death which is implanted in us as a result of our ignorance of what is wont to happen in life in accordance with the decree of necessity or destiny. Excellent is the advice which the Pythagoreans Carmina Aurea , 17. gave, saying: Whatsoe’er woes by the gods’ dispensation all mortals must suffer, What be the fate you must bear, you should bear it and not be indignant. And the tragic poet Aeschylus Attributed to Euripides by Stobaeus, Florilegium , cviii. 43; Cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. , Euripides, No. 1078. says: It is the mark of just and knowing men In woes to feel no anger at the gods; and Euripides From an unknown play; Cf. Nauck, ibid. , Euripides, No. 965. : Of mortals he who yields to fate we think Is wise and knows the ways of Providence; and in another place From the Melanippe; cf. Nauck, ibid. , Euripides, No. 505. he says: Of mortals he who bears his lot aright To me seems noblest and of soundest sense.